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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays the number of people that outsource their data to the cloud increases 
dramatically. Cloud computing offer cost-effective dynamic, scalable and shared services for 
enterprises from remote data centre. However, the problem of trusting cloud computing is a 
paramount concern for most enterprises in such a way that trust is widely regarded as one of the 
top obstacles for the adoption and growth of cloud computing. There are a lot of methods proposed 
by researchers to help the consumers identify the cloud service provider who seems to be more 
reliable. These trust-aided unified evaluation framework help in measuring the trustworthiness of 
cloud service providers. This work provides a generic analytical framework to compare different 
trust models based on a set of assessment criteria to help cloud consumers find the trust model that 
best satisfies their trust concerns in cloud computing.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, cloud computing has been receiving much attention as a new computing 
paradigm for providing flexible and on-demand infrastructures, platforms, and software as 
services. According to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [1], “Cloud 
computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction”. Cloud computing offers service dynamism, elasticity and wide variety of 
choices to enterprises. In today’s competitive environment, enterprises cannot ignore these 
services. Flexible cloud computing services require one party (i.e.  Cloud Consumer (CC)) rely on 
the actions of other party (i.e. Cloud Service Provider (CSP)), therefore, trust has become a vital 
component of such services.  
Trust is a complex social phenomenon. Based on the concepts of trust developed in social 
sciences [2, 3], trust is a mental state comprising: (1) expectancy in which the trustor expects a 
specific behavior from the trustee such as providing valid information or effectively performing 
cooperative actions; (2) belief in which the trustor believes that the expected behavior occurs, 
based on the evidence of the trustee’s competence, integrity, and goodwill; (3) willingness to take 
risk –in which the trustor is willing to take risk for that belief” [4]. Although intuitively easy to 
comprehend, the notion of trust has not been scholarly defined [5].  
In order to use cloud services, an enterprise needs to give up control of its assets (i.e. data) 
to the CSP. Loss of control on stored data in cloud triggers uncertainty about data confidentiality, 
privacy, integrity and availability for CCs which adversely affects adoptability of cloud computing 
services. Enterprises have to remember that as compelling as cloud services are, it isn't without 
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potential problems. Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), as an example of cloud services, had 
suffered an outage for several hours in February 2008 that resulted in numerous customer 
Web applications going offline [6, 7]. Enterprises also must consider the possibility that data could 
be stolen or viewed by people who are not authorized to see it. CSPs take all user critical 
information and put on virtual servers while users may never know if stored information will be 
used against their consent. CSP can be forced by government agencies to reveal stored data. For 
example, based on the U.S.A. Patriot Act [8] and other national security related laws, the U.S. 
government has the unfettered ability to obtain access to data stored inside and outside the United 
States by U.S. CSPs or their foreign subsidiaries. Same rules and concerns can be applied for other 
countries. For individual users of famous CSPs like Microsoft, Amazon, Apple and etc., the bigger 
risk is to lose the access to their online accounts that store numerous amount of personal data such 
as pictures and videos, email correspondences and banking information because of accusation of 
terms of service violation. Although, most of such cases can be resolved, it may take long time for 
communication with CSP and meanwhile users do not have access to their personal data. 
According to [9], trust management is ranked among the top 10 obstacles for adopting cloud 
computing. Adoptability of cloud services depends on establishment of trust on CSP to assure data 
security and guarantee cloud performance and behavior.  
CSPs and consumers can take advantage of the benefits of cloud computing technologies 
when an effective trust management system is designed and implemented for cloud computing 
services, properly. To guarantee effectiveness of trust management in offered cloud computing 
services, on-going and state-of-the-art evaluation techniques are required. Evaluation of trust in 
cloud computing is a challenging issue since trust is subjective and case sensitive. In order to 
evaluate trust in cloud services, different methods and techniques have been proposed which are 
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commonly known as the “Trust Models” in literature [10-15]. For simplicity, existing trust models 
can be categorized into five trust mechanisms based on the common elements between literatures 
in this area [2, 14-19]. First category is reputation based trust mechanism which uses an aggregated 
opinion of a community in defining the trust worthiness of a cloud service. Second category is 
authentication based trust mechanism in which a CSP is trustworthy if it complies with a trusted 
policy. Third category is Service Level Agreement (SLA) based trust which is based on contracts 
and agreements signed by CSPs for the delivery of their services to CCs. Fourth category is domain 
based trust which divides the cloud into autonomous number of domains and uses authentication 
mechanisms for evaluating the trust worthiness of the entities inside or outside of the domain. The 
last category is platform based trust which uses a security assurance policy for a platform. 
Trust in cloud computing has attracted lots of attention in recent years. There have been 
many trust models (such as [20 - 34]) proposed to study trust in cloud computing. Each trust model 
may be limited to certain features of cloud services. Therefore, it is vital for enterprises to be able 
to evaluate effectiveness of trust models based on a holistic view of most important issues in 
offered cloud services.  People have realized the importance of trust in cloud computing towards 
vast adaptation of cloud service. There are researches focusing on the analysis and evaluation of 
existing trust models. For example, Kanwal and et al. [14] have studied twelve trust models and 
classified these trust models into five mechanisms. They have evaluated seven parameters for 
twelve studied trust models and quantified each parameter strength as low, medium or high. 
Corradini and et al. [16] have investigated fourteen trust models. They have categorized these trust 
models into three mechanisms to search for the major causes of lack of trust in each mechanism. 
They have summarized that lack of reliable and efficient evaluation system is a major barrier 
against adoption of cloud computing services. Rathi and et al. [16, 17] have investigated trust from 
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two different angles including trustworthiness of cloud user (CU) and trustworthiness of CSP. 
They have studied five different mechanisms to determine their disadvantages for trust on CSP 
and have concluded that lack of transparency is the major issue for establishing trust. However, 
they did not mention their evaluation method. Huang and et al. [18] have defined five different 
mechanisms and defined role of four cloud entities including CSP, cloud service, cloud auditor 
and cloud broker. They have examined each entity considering domain of expectancy and source 
of trust in the five mechanisms. Firdhous and et al. [19] have studied trust in the distributed 
systems. They have evaluated thirteen trust models in cloud computing using six evaluating 
parameters. Although they evaluated trust models based on different parameters, trust mechanisms 
are not included in their evaluation. 
In spite of the existing surveys on trust in cloud, there is a need for a more comprehensive 
and up-to-date survey to investigate the most recent trust models, as more and more new trust 
models and techniques have been proposed and existing surveys did not cover them Moreover, 
previous surveys use their own ad hoc parameters to do the evaluation and comparison. This would 
cause confusion for enterprises to understand the criteria of trust evaluation and the main concerns 
about trust. This survey tries to address the aforementioned problems and help people understand 
trust issues in cloud computing. In this survey, we have systematically studied various trust models 
including the most up-to-date models to provide a holistic view and evaluation method for trust 
management in cloud computing. We have categorized fourteen assessment criteria widely used 
in existing research into six groups that evaluate the main concerns in trust management. Selected 
assessment criteria provide measureable criterions to compare trust models. We have identified 
possible risks and threats for trust management in cloud computing. Finally, we categorize existing 
trust models into five different mechanisms. 
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This thesis is organized into 5 chapters. The first chapter contains an introduction to the 
work completed. It also presents the motivation for the research work, and the objective of the 
thesis. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical baselines. Reviews the definition of trust and the trust 
mechanisms. Chapter 3 includes research strategy. Explains how we conducted the research and 
what parameters are we using to analyze the trust models. Chapter 4 reviews some of the latest 
and known trust models  and discussed the characteristics of the models and how they help in 
calculating trust in cloud computing.  Also, categorize the trust models into six categories and 
analyze them based on three set of parameters, system characteristics parameters, security 
evaluating parameters and trust evaluating parameters. Chapter 5 provides a discussion on how to 
use the suggested analytical framework. Chapter 6 contains the thesis conclusion. In this chapter 
we compared all the trust models discussed in chapter 4 based on system characteristics, security 
and trust evaluating parameters.  
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF TRUST AND CLOUD COMPUTING 
2.1. Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is a paradigm that provides flexible and on-demand infrastructures, 
platform and software as services. Cloud computing has emerged as a result of combining the 
benefits of grid computing [35] and virtualization with those of service-oriented computing [36] 
to utilize computer resources (data centers) and deliver computer resources as services. Cloud 
computing uses virtualization techniques to design and govern the services it offers to automate 
business logics. Cloud environments promise several benefits such as reduced expenses and 
simplicity to service providers and service requesters [35, 37]. For instance, it only took 24 hours, 
at the cost of merely $240, for the New York Times to archive its 11 million articles using a cloud 
service named Amazon Web Services [38]. 
Cloud services are established based on five essential characteristics [1].The first 
characteristic is the on demand self-service, which enables consumers to provision computing 
power, storage, networks and software in a simple and flexible way. Second is broad network 
access in which cloud service consumers can access available computing resources over the 
network. Third is resource pooling where computing resources are pooled to serve multiple cloud 
service consumers based on a multitenant model where physical and virtual computing resources 
are dynamically reassigned on demand, forth is rapid elasticity where computing resources are 
elastically provisioned to scale rapidly based on the cloud service consumers need, and the last 
one is measured service where computing resources usage is monitored, metered, controlled, and 
reported to provide transparency for both CSPs and consumers [1]. 
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2.1.1. Cloud Service Models 
Cloud services have three different models. One of the service models is Infrastructure as 
a Service (IaaS) which provides raw storage space, computing, or network resources for the 
customers to run and execute any software that they choose. The other service model is Platform 
as a Service (PaaS) which the CSP provides the hardware and a toolkit and a number of supported 
programming languages to build higher level services. The users who are typically software 
developers host their applications on the platform and provide these applications to the end-users. 
The third service model is Software as a Service (SaaS) which the CC is the end-user who just 
have access to the complete applications running on a cloud infrastructure and offered on a 
platform on-demand.  
2.1.2. Infrastructure Deployment Models of Cloud 
The different infrastructure deployment models are distinguishing by their architecture, the 
location of the datacenter where the cloud is realized, and the needs of the CC. Public clouds is 
one of the deployment models which runs applications from different CCs who share this 
infrastructure and pay for their resource utilization on a utility computing basis. Private clouds is 
another deployment model which is built for the exclusive use of one CC, who owns and fully 
controls this cloud. The third deployment model in cloud computing is Community clouds in which 
CCs who have similar requirements, can share an infrastructure and configuration and 
management of the cloud. The last deployment models is Hybrid clouds which consist of any 
composition of other deployment models.   
8 
 
2.1.3. Possible Risks and Threats of Cloud Computing  
Trust is one of the main concerns for the consumers to adopt Cloud computing [39]. Based 
on the common elements between literatures in this area [39-42], cloud computing risks and threats 
are: 
 Lack of Confidentiality 
According to standard computing literature [43], the IT Security is depend on the 
Confidentiality of data. In cloud computing confidentiality is achieved by encryption. To achieve 
confidentiality the encryption schemes need to be secure for long term. Also, confidentiality is 
threatened by decrypting data while using it.  Furthermore, information leakage vulnerability in 
third-party compute Clouds pose threats to Confidentiality too [44].  
 Lack of Reliability 
Availability of resources in Cloud Computing is one of the biggest concerns for the 
consumers [45, 46]. Availability is not just consist of reachability but also success rate of 
transactions. However, the CSPs look at availability as a way to represent the level of reliability 
of the cloud services. The availability that the CSPs claim they provide to their CCs which is more 
like %99, is not clearly defined as it is the availability of a single server or the availability of the 
servers resides in data centers in different locations of the world [46].  
 Lack of Identity Management 
Federated Identity Management (FIM) is an important terminology in the case of federated 
clouds. FIM provides tool for sharing resources and services among different enterprises while the 
directory services, authentication and authorization do not have same technologies.  But it is 
possible that FIM have the enterprises to use authentication broker (a common trusted third party) 
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as identity management provider. However, this kind of application can consider as a threat for 
the security of the entire service inventory [39].  
 Lack of Privacy 
From the CCs perspective, privacy is an important concern in cloud computing and entails 
the protection and appropriate use of the personal information of CCs, and the meeting of 
expectations of CCs about its use. For organizations, privacy entails the application of laws, 
policies, standards and processes by which Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of individuals 
is managed. Context is very important as privacy threats differ according to the type of cloud 
scenario. Some cloud application areas and services might face a very low privacy threat, for 
example if the service is to process information that is public. It is only if the service handles 
personal information, in the sense of collecting, transferring, processing, sharing or storing it, that 
there could be a privacy risk and privacy needs to be taken into account [39]. Privacy becomes 
very important when multiple services need to be combined to enable a new service. For example, 
print on demand service in cloud which can be provided by combining a printing service with a 
storage service [40] can cause a privacy threat since the information regarding the services might 
need to flow across service providers’ boundaries [40].  
 Lack of Reputation 
With the growing number of CSPs, the CCs are facing a challenge to select the best and 
most appropriate providers from numerous offers. In [42], the author points out a typical scenario, 
where a CSP can offer a secure service while another may not, if the latter charges half the price, 
the majority of organizations will ask for the latter one as there is no real way to explore the 
difference.  
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 Lack of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
Standard SLAs in the present Cloud market are also one of the obstacles that the consumers 
face while adopting the services offered by the CSPs. Consumers might face problems that occur 
from vendor lock-in, insufficient security measures, data unavailability, hidden costs, and non-
transparent infrastructure. In most cases, SLAs are created to protect the vendors/providers and 
not the CCs. Most of the above mentioned problems are overlooked in current SLAs offered by 
the CSPs [47].  
 Lack of transparency 
Providers of cloud computing technologies may be unlikely to share information about 
processes, operations, controls, and methodologies, especially related to IT general controls 
affecting the cloud environment. There are some transparent security principles help identify the 
types of information that should and should not be disclosed. Those that should be disclosed are: 
Common security features such as the use of firewalls and encryption of data in transmission or at 
rest should be disclosed because they are considered basic security features that most security 
people would expect to be in place anyway, performing disclosure when it is imperative due to a 
legal or regulatory requirement, Security architectural details that may either help or hinder 
security management should be disclosed, governance responsibilities of the CC versus those of 
the CSP should be clearly articulated so that CCs are clear on what they must do themselves to 
help protect their data. Also, there are some principals for which disclosure is not recommended 
which are: do not disclose anything that could create risk to the datacenter or to the integrity of 
data stored in the datacenter, if disclosure could create potential harm for a CC or partner, it should 
be avoided, avoid disclosures that could create undue liability for the CSP, if disclosure would 
result in breach of a legal or regulatory requirement, it should be avoided. [48]  
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2.2. Trust 
The purpose of trusted computing is to solve some of today's security problems through 
hardware changes to personal computer. Trust is a crucial enabling factor in relations where there 
is uncertainty, interdependence, risk, and fear of opportunism [49]. [2, 3] has defined trust as a 
mental state which is consists of expectancy, belief and willingness to take risk. Based on this 
definition two types of trusts can be introduced [50]. One of them is trust in performance which is 
the trust about what the trustee performs. The other one is trust in belief which is the trust about 
what the trustee believes. The trustee’s performance should be based on what he says or what he 
does. For example, if we consider x as what the trustee says then trust_p(d,e,x,k) represents that 
trustor d trusts trustee e regarding e’s performance x in context k. This relationship means that if 
x is made by e in context k, then d believes x in that context [51]. 
∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑝(𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑥, 𝑘) ≡ 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐵𝑦(𝑥, 𝑒, 𝑘) ⊃ 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒(𝑑, 𝑘 ⊃ 𝑥) (2.1) 
   where ⊃ is an operator used for reified propositions to mimic the logical operator for 
implication. A trust in belief relationship, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑏(𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑥, 𝑘), represents that trustor d trusts trustee 
e regarding e’s belief (x) in context k. This trust relationship means that if e believes x in context 
k, then d also believes x in that context [51]: 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑏(𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑥, 𝑘) ≡ 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒(𝑒, 𝑘 ⊃ 𝑥) ⊃ 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒(𝑑, 𝑘 ⊃ 𝑥) (2.2) 
McKnight et al. believes that trust develops gradually over time so it starts small and then 
gradually increases. They define initial trust as “trust in an unfamiliar trustee, a relationship in 
which the actors do not yet have credible, meaningful information about, or affective bonds with, 
each other”. They also define trusting beliefs as the confident trustor perception that the trustee 
has attributes that are beneficial to the trustor. There are three types of trust beliefs. One of them 
is Competence which is the ability of the trustee to do what the trustor needs. The Second one is 
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benevolence and is defined as the trustee caring and motivation to act in the trustor’s interests and 
the last one is integrity, which is the honesty of the trustee and promise keeping [48]. 
2.2.1. Apply Trust in Cloud Computing Models 
In order to gain trust on CSPs, transparency and accountability play important role. 
Security, Trust & Assurance Registry (STAR) is a free publicly accessible registry program which 
is launched by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) to increase the cloud transparency. This program 
helps CSPs to publish self-assessment of their security controls, in either a Consensus Assessments 
Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) or a Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM). CAIQ contains over 140 
frequent questions that is useful for cloud users or auditors. CCM is a framework describing how 
a CSP aligns with the CSA security guide [53]. STAR is a useful source for users who are seeking 
for cloud services and the information offered is a CSP’s self -assessment. Cloud Trust Protocol 
(CTP) [54], is a request-response mechanism for a cloud user to obtain specific information about 
the elements of transparency which includes aspects of configuration, vulnerability, audit log, 
service management, service statistics, and so forth and are applied to a specific CSP. The primary 
purpose of the CTP and the elements of transparency is to generate evidence-based confidence that 
everything that is claimed to be happening in the cloud is indeed happening as described, and 
nothing else [8]. CTP helps user’s internal observations of cloud service operations by providing 
an interesting channel between cloud users and CSPs. One of the weakness of STAR and CTP is 
that its information is provided by CSP itself and if CSP be dishonest it can filter out or change 
data which would violate data’s reliability based on trust judgement. 
Trust is an important concept in distributed computing environments and plays a critical 
role in ensuring and enhancing system security and adaptability. There are a number of challenges 
that affect trust in different distributed systems for example in social networks, hackers are a 
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serious threat since they try to access the user accounts and use them as a trusted source to spread 
malwares. Also, tools that help in managing, viewing, querying, transferring and displaying 
personal data in the system and provide searching and mining profile data can be considered as 
another trust issue in social networks. In P2P networks security implications arise from abusing 
trust between peers. One of the trust issues exists in peer to peer networks is the distributed denial 
of service (DoS). Also, attackers can make use of the querying nature of P2P networks to overload 
the network by sending a massive number of queries to peers, make the portions of the network 
inoperable. Since in P2P network the peers should contribute in resource distribution process, 
peer’s data stream may be compromised by fellow peers who assist in transmitting the data in the 
system, and sometimes free to freeload off other peers.  
As mentioned in section 2.1, Cloud Computing supports four deployment models which 
are public clouds, private clouds, community clouds and hybrid clouds. Kumar et al. [52] believe 
that in cloud computing, deployment models can affect trust. In a private cloud, trust is not 
applicable if the third party is not involved. However, public clouds can introduce many security 
risks since controlling data in this deployment model is very challenging. Trust in community 
cloud depends on the role of third party. If there is a third party involved, the trust risks are the 
same as corresponding case in private cloud. Otherwise, if the community cloud is managed by 
the organizations in the community, trust risks are limited to the trust relationships that are 
discussed and agreed between community members. In Hybrid clouds, since both the private 
clouds and public clouds are involved, all the trust issues related to public cloud shift to hybrid 
cloud, too.  
14 
 
2.2.2. Trust Mechanisms 
Trust models are the techniques that are used for evaluating trust in cloud services. They 
can be categorized in certain categories named trust mechanisms [2]. This paper has categorized 
trust models into five common trust mechanisms based on [2, 55-60]. 
 Reputation Based  
Trust and reputation are different from each other. Trust is the subjective expectation of 
one entity about another within a specific context at a given time [3-4, 61]. Reputation, on the 
other hand, is what is believed about an entity’s standing by the community [61]. This belief can 
be derived from direct or indirect experiences collected in previous interactions between entities. 
It is important to note that trust can be used to determine the reputation of an entity, and vice versa 
[62]. 
Trust is consider between two entities however, reputation of an entity is the aggregated 
opinion of a community towards that entity. In other word, an entity that has high reputation is 
trusted by many entities in that community. An entity can use reputation to calculate the trust level 
of the trustee.  
In cloud computing reputation is very important since it will impact cloud users. Therefore, 
CSPs are trying to achieve higher reputation. Reputation is shown by a comprehensive score that 
is based on the overall opinion and score for the major aspects of performance.  
At the first time that a user want to choose a cloud service reputation of the CSP who offer 
the service is very important but it is not important afterwards since performance and reliability of 
the service can establish trust between user and CSP. 
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This category of trust models contains those trust models that collect the feedback and 
opinions from other CCs to evaluate trust on cloud services. The trust model selects the most 
reliable and trusted CSP by evaluating the CCs’ feedback. 
 Authentication Based 
Encryption and Key Management are important technologies that can help secure 
applications and data in cloud. PKI is a technology that introduces a trust mechanism to support 
digital signature, key certification and validation, attribute certification and validation.  
It is supposed that Alice has a digital document supposedly signed by Bob using his private 
key 𝐾𝑏
′  and to validate, she needs Bob’s public key 𝐾𝑏. 𝐾1 is Alice trust public key and 𝐶𝐴1 is her 
certification authority. Alice uses 𝐶𝐴1’s public key 𝐾1 to validate 𝐶𝐴2’s public key 𝐾2; because 
Alice trusts 𝐶𝐴1 on public key certification, and 𝐶𝐴2’s public key is certified by 𝐶𝐴1, Alice can 
believe that 𝐶𝐴2’s public key is  𝐾2; then Alice uses  𝐾2 to validate 𝐶𝐴3’ public key  𝐾3; and finally 
uses  𝐾3 to validate Bob’s public key  𝐾𝑏. In order to become sure that Bob’s key is 𝐾𝑏, Alice 
should trust 𝐶𝐴3This trust can come from recommendations along the chain of certificates by those 
certificate issuers or comes from compliance with certain certificate policies [63]. 
A public key certificate also contains a certificate policy (CP) extension. The certificate 
means that the issuing CA who conforms to the specified CP asserts that the subject CA has the 
certified public key, and the subject CA also adheres to the specified CP. As a result, to infer 
Alice’s belief in CA3’s key and Bob’s key, she must trust that CP in the sense that any CA 
conforming to that CP will generate valid public key certificates [63]. 
Since PKI is currently practiced, trust in a certification authority (CA) with respect to 
issuing and maintaining valid public key certificates is based on the CA’s conformance with 
certain certificate policies. Certificate policies play a central role in PKI trust. 
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This category includes trust models that use certificates (issued by standardized bodies), 
trust tickets, private and public keys, TPM endorsement keys issued by trusted third party or 
certificate authority (CA) to ensure the integrity, availability and confidentiality of data on Cloud 
and evaluates the confidence of CCs regarding the expected behavior of cloud services.  
 
Figure 2.1. Trust relations in public key validation and certificate [63] 
 
 SLA Based 
A service level agreement (SLA) is a legal contract between a cloud user and a CSP. SLA 
is a service lever agreement. It is one of the approaches to establish trust on CSPs. The entities that 
are providing services are required to follow standardized SLA, e.g., proposed by Cloud 
Computing Use Cases community [64]. SLA validation [65] and monitoring [66] schemes are used 
to verify the quality of CSPs and CCs are responsible for monitoring SLA violations. Since SLA 
compensation clauses are developed by the CSPs, CCs do not have enough chance to apply for 
compensation if SLA violation happens and this is a problem due to lack of standardized SLAs for 
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the stakeholders in cloud computing market. However industry driven initiative [67] have 
addressed this problem but still it is not fully implemented.  
There are a number of other issues with SLA based trust. First, SLA focuses on the 
“visible” elements of cloud service performance, and does not address “invisible” elements such 
as security and privacy. Second, many cloud users do not have enough capability to perform SLA 
verification on their own and they need a professional third party help to provide these services. 
In a private cloud the trusted broker or trust authority who is trusted in the trust domain of the 
private cloud can provide the users the services of SLA verification. In a hybrid cloud, a user 
within a private cloud might still rely on the private cloud trust authority to conduct and SLA 
verification; however, in a public cloud, individual users and some small organizations without 
technical capability may use a commercial professional cloud entity as trust broker.  
Trust establishment under this category is based on contracts and agreements signed by 
CSPs for the delivery of different services to CCs. SLA provides the basis for trust establishment. 
Various security concerns and quality of service attributes are included in contracts and agreements 
to establish trust on CSP [15].  
 Domain Based 
Basic idea in domain based trust model is to divide the Cloud into number of autonomous 
domains and distinguish two types of within-domain and inter-domain trust relationships 
respectively. Within-domain trust values depend upon the transactions between the entities that 
are in the same domain. If an entity needs to compute the trust value for some other entity, it checks 
the direct trust table but if the direct trust value is not found then it looks for the recommended 
trust values from other entities [68]. 
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The inter-domain trust relationship is using the trust relationship between domains. There 
is an authentication mechanism for each domain which trusts the authentication mechanisms of 
other domains. If an entity is authenticated by one domain, then its authentication is acceptable by 
all other domains.  
 Platform Based 
Platform based trust models consists of policies that ensure applications are executing on 
platforms that meet a specified trust assurance level and evaluate the confidence of CCs on using 
cloud services lunch on a specific platform.  Therefore, by using this trust model, CCs can trust a 
CSP to use the offered platform [68].  
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CHAPTER 3. TRUST MODELS STUDY METHODOLOGY 
CC’s trust in cloud computing systems can vary based on the scope and context of 
applications in cloud computing. For example, CCs who are using data storage applications for 
storing their sensitive information on the cloud, have different requirements than those who use 
cloud for online gaming service. CSPs should offer a secure and controllable environment for those 
CCs who use data storage applications to get CCs’ trust, while, for those who use gaming services, 
CSPs should just offer a high performance environment. Therefore, there are different trust models 
available for evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud services and CCs can choose one based on 
the service they want to use. Therefore, it becomes difficult to select a trust model that best satisfies 
the user’s requirements.  There is a need for assessment criteria that can evaluate the trust models 
and helps the users in selection of most suitable model in line with their preferences. In this chapter, 
in order to evaluate the goodness of different solutions, fourteen assessment criteria [14-19, 81] 
have been selected to address different aspects of identified challenges for trust models. Figure 3.1 
shows how the selected assessment criteria being categorized by the risks and threats listed in 
section 2.1.3. These assessment criteria help to evaluate the goodness of the trust models in 
evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud services and also help to define which aspect of trust is 
evaluated and which cloud computing risks and threats is addressed by considering each of these 
assessment criteria.  
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Figure 3.1. Assessment criteria and cloud computing risks and threats 
 
3.1. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Confidentiality in Cloud Computing 
As explained in section 2.1.3, confidentiality is one of the challenges for trust models in 
cloud computing. The CCs who need a confidential cloud service, should choose the trust models 
that evaluates the following trust feature in trust management systems.  
 Encryption 
Based on [69], encryption is one strategy that CSPs use to protect enterprise cloud data 
from cybercriminals and any unauthorized access. Cloud Data Encryption mathematically 
transforms data so that it is undecipherable without the “key” that can be used to change the data 
back to its original form.  
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3.2. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Reliability in Cloud Computing 
As explained in section 2.1.3, reliability is one of the challenges for trust models in cloud 
computing. These assessment criteria help those CCs for whom reliability is very important and 
need reliable cloud services. They should choose the trust models that evaluate the following 
assessment criteria in the cloud system.  
 Attack Resistance  
As soon as the influence of trust and reputation models on the decision of CCs will grow, 
the interests in manipulating those values in Cloud environment will grow accordingly, as already 
seen in other service environments earlier [69]. A number of different attacks (e.g., playbooks, 
proliferation attacks, reputation lag attacks, false praise or accusation (collusion), whitewashing 
(reentry), Sybil attacks, etc.) against trust and reputation systems have been discussed [69, 70]. 
These types of attacks will also be of concern when designing trust and reputation system for Cloud 
computing environments. Thus, attack resiliency is a central design goal for developers of these 
kind of systems. This is one of the Quality of Service (QoS) parameters that is defined in [69] to 
evaluate the trust models. 
 Punishment of Agreement Violation 
Punishment is one of the approaches to deal with the violation of security policies. If 
violation cannot be prevented in a system, then they need to be detected and punishment protocols 
can be meting out to the violator. Punishment can be done automatically such as destruction of 
anonymity or it can be done by a mediator which can be an entity that is already part of the system, 
or can be someone external to the system. Punishment is been used in [68] to evaluate the trust 
models.  
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3.3. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Identity Management in Cloud Computing 
As explained in section 2.1.3 identity management is one of the challenges for trust models 
in cloud computing. The following assessment criteria help evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud 
services base on identity management criteria.   
 Identity Management 
CSA [71], explains one of the important concepts in cloud computing is identity 
management and authentication. Authentication is the process of validating or confirming that 
access credentials provided by a user are valid. A user in this case could be a person, another 
application, or a service; all should be required to authenticate. Many enterprise applications 
require that users authenticate before allowing access. Authorization, the process of granting 
access to requested resources, is pointless without suitable authentication [71]. When organizations 
begin to utilize applications in the cloud, authenticating users in a trustworthy and manageable 
manner becomes an additional challenge. Organizations must address authentication-related 
challenges such as credential management, strong authentication, delegated authentication, and 
trust across all types of cloud delivery models (SPI). In order to grant safe access to sensitive 
information and resources to all those who need it, organizations must carefully monitor which 
users are accessing what resources to ensure that they are accessing the resources that they need 
in an appropriate manner. Because of this, it is predicting that identity and access management in 
the cloud will be one of the top three most sought after services moving forward for cloud-based 
models [71]. This is one of the parameters that is defined in [2] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Bootstrapping 
A bootstrap [72- 75] is the process of starting up a system. In cloud computing trust 
management bootstrapping is the initial value that is assigned to trustee by trustor. During the 
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bootstrapping process the trustor will send out an authentication key to the trustee and the trustee 
can authorize the trustor. As an example, Google allows its cloud users to use SSH to connect to 
a Google compute engine virtual machine instance from within the Google Cloud Platform 
Console. However, this method is an alternative to other methods of connecting to an instance in 
Google cloud platform console [76]. This is one of the parameters that is defined in [2] to evaluate 
the trust models. 
3.4. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Privacy in Cloud Computing 
As explained in section 2.1.3, privacy is one of the challenges for trust models in cloud 
computing. The following assessment criteria help evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud services 
base on privacy criteria. 
 Transferability 
CC trust in a CSP depends on the specific application context or the scope of interaction. 
Transfer of trust across those contexts is a significant challenge for trust and reputation systems. 
Consider, for example, a service provider offering an email service and a video rendering service 
– both belonging to the SaaS category. Both application contexts require different competencies, 
for example spam protection and storage for the email context, whereas for video rendering 
context, latency, bandwidth and assessment criteria dealing with performance matters (e.g., 
response time, Content Delivery Node (CDN) facilities, etc.) are important. Here, transferring trust 
established in one context (email) to the other one (video rendering) is not a trivial task, and could, 
for instance, be supported by combining the outside-in and the inside-out evaluation [81]. This is 
one of the QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models.  
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 Heterogeneity Support 
Heterogeneity in cloud computing refers to structural differences of the devices and it 
comes in different forms. In cloud computing high level of homogeneity is required for resource 
virtualization which means the same infrastructure can be used to support different tenants with 
different protection and system requirements. This can led to trust problems since heterogeneous 
cloud infrastructures make it difficult to have effective controls to check privacy compliance in an 
automated way and the end-user has no means to verify that his/her privacy requirements are being 
fulfilled. This is one of the parameters that is defined in [2] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Security Enabled Trust 
Security Enabled Trust (Hard trust [77]) which is defined as trust that is derived from 
concrete security mechanisms such as validation of properties through certificates [78] and 
involves aspects like authenticity, encryption, and security in transactions[79]. This is one of the 
QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
3.5. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Reputation 
As explained in section 2.1.3, trust is one of the challenges for trust models in cloud 
computing. The following assessment criteria help evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud services 
base on reputation criteria. 
 Trust Evaluation 
For complex distributed environments like cloud computing, trust can be evaluated based 
on the following approaches: Black box approach in which the trustworthiness of an entity or a 
service is evaluated taking into account only the observed output such as feedback, Inside-out 
approach in which the trustworthiness of an entity or a service is derived based on the knowledge 
about the architecture of the service and the trustworthiness of its components or subsystems, 
25 
 
Outside-in approach which requires knowledge about the internal architecture of a service and its 
components as input as well as information stating the observed behavior of the overall service. 
The goal of this kind of model is to derive the trustworthiness of internal components of a service 
composition based on its external behavior [80]. This is one of the QoS parameters that is defined 
in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Trust Scope 
In global reputation systems, the reputation of a service provider is based on the opinions 
from the general population, which is public and visible to all the system members, while in local 
reputation systems, the reputation of a CSP is built on the opinions from a group of particular 
people. It is much harder and more complicated to design a global reputation mechanism in a 
decentralized system than in a centralized system [81]. This is one of the QoS parameters that is 
defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Reputation Enabled Trust 
Reputation Enabled Trust (Soft trust [77]) is defined as trust that is derived from past 
experiences and behavior associated with an entity. An example of soft trust is reputation, which 
is a component of online trust that is perhaps a company’s most valuable asset [82]. This is one of 
the QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Trust Aggregation 
There are two different fundamental approaches to store and aggregate trust-related 
information [81]. In a centralized trust management system a single globally trusted server will 
take all the responsibilities of managing reputations for all the members. In decentralized system, 
there is no central server and the members in the system have to cooperate and share the 
responsibilities to manage reputation in the whole system. Trust models that use centralized 
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architectures are prone to scalability and security issues. A centralized system relies on the 
assumption that the system participants completely trust the centralized authority which in turn 
must be correct and always available. If the centralized authority is not carefully designed, it can 
become a single point of failure for the entire system. This is one of the QoS parameters that is 
defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
 Trust Evidence 
Trust evidence is a factor of trust which includes direct interactions and indirect 
interactions between trustor and trustee. Direct trust means trust that is obtained by entities’ direct 
interaction. Indirect trust or recommended trust means trust that is obtained from credible third 
party who has direct contact with the designated one [83]. Some system are using both direct and 
indirect interactions while others use either only indirect or direct interactions. This is one of the 
QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
3.6. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of SLA Support in Cloud Computing 
As explained in section 2.1.3, SLA support is one of the challenges for trust models in 
cloud computing. The following assessment criteria help evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud 
services base on SLA support criteria. 
 SLA verification  
As mentioned in earlier, SLA is a legal contract between a cloud user and a CSP and is one 
of the approaches to establish trust on CSPs. This assessment criteria evaluates the trust models to 
see if they support SLA. This is one of the QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the 
trust models. 
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3.7. Assessment Criteria for Evaluating Lack of Transparency 
As explained in section 2.1.3, transparency is one of the challenges for trust models in 
cloud computing. The following assessment criteria help evaluating the trustworthiness of cloud 
services base on transparency criteria. 
 Transparency  
The derived trust values or reputation scores must be transparent to and comprehensible 
enough for the consumers, so that they can easily and confidently make trust-based decision. To 
make the trust values transparent and comprehensible, users need to be supplied with an intuitive 
representation of trust together with enough information regarding the relevant assessment criteria. 
This is one of the QoS parameters that is defined in [69] to evaluate the trust models. 
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CHAPTER 4. TRUST MODELS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
As explained in chapter 2, this work has categorized trust models into five categories 
named trust mechanisms which are reputation based trust models, authentication based trust 
models, SLA based trust models, domain based trust models and platform based trust models. This 
chapter studies selected list of recent and popular trust models in each category and analyzes them 
based on the research methodology explained in chapter 3. 
4.1. Reputation Based Trusts 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, in reputation based trust models, an entity’s reputation is 
usually evaluated based on feedback from those who have direct interactions with the entity. 
Therefore, this category includes the trust models that collect CC’s feedback to evaluate trust on 
cloud services. In this section in order to evaluate reputation based trust models some of the recent 
trust models have been studied and analyzed based on the assessment criteria discussed in chapter 
3.  
 Wanga et al. (2014) [84] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Accurate and Multi-faceted Reputation 
(AMRep) [84] trust model which introduces a couple of malicious rating detection approaches to 
improve the accuracy of reputation calculation. AMRep employs multiple rating indexes. By 
processing all index ratings in an inter-dependent way, AMRep builds an accurate index reputation 
calculation model, which can effectively identify malicious users and improve the accuracy of the 
reputation calculation. AMRep also designs a multi-faceted reputation evaluation method, which 
combines relevant index reputation values to deduce the attribute reputation values of a cloud 
service at various granularity [84].  
The reputation value in this model is calculated as follow [84]: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑙
𝑡+1 =
∑ 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑙𝑖
𝑡+1 × 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑧
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑙𝑘
𝑧
𝑘=1
 
(4.1) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑙
𝑡+1 is the multi-faced reputation value of attribute 𝐴𝑙 after t + 1 evaluation 
cycles. 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑙𝑖
𝑡+1 is the the cumulative reputation value after t+1 evaluation cycle. 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the 
corresponding weight vector elements. 
 Tan et al. (2014) [85] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Trust Work Flow Scheduling (TWFS) which is 
a trust model for workflow applications in cloud computing. This model proposes a trust service-
oriented workflow scheduling algorithm. The scheduling algorithm adopts a trust metric that 
combines direct trust and recommendation trust.  
The trust value in TWFS is calculated as follow [85]: 
𝑇𝑟(𝑆𝑖) = (1 −
1
𝑒𝑘
) ∗ (
𝑛𝑖 + 1
𝑁𝑖 + 2
) + (1 − (1 −
1
𝑒𝑘
)) ∗ ((
1
|𝑆𝑖|
∗ ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑗) +
∑ 𝑤𝑎𝑖(𝑣𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ |𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑎𝑖|𝑗∈𝑆𝑖
 
(4.2) 
where k is the number of times that the 𝑖th service is used by the service client. 𝑛𝑖, denoting 
the number of successful interactions, and 𝑁𝑖, denoting the total number of interactions for the 𝑖th 
service. 𝑆𝑖 be the set of services rated by user 𝑖, and 𝑣𝑖𝑗 be the rating given by user 𝑖 to the jth 
service. Next, let average ?̅?𝑖 be the average rating by user 𝑖. The weight 𝑤𝑎𝑖 reflects the similarity 
between user a and user 𝑖. The weights for the users are calculated by the Pearson correlation 
coefficient (PCC) which is widely used to compute the degree of similar relationship between two 
variables. The algorithm for implementing TWFS proposed by WenAn Tan et al. is as follow: The 
Input of the algorithm is request processing time, cost, and trust value and the output is a workflow 
schedule strategy for Enterprise Information Systems [85].   
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 Muchahari et al (2012) [86]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Cloud Service Registry and Discovery Trust 
(CSRD) [86] trust model which is a trust model that serves as CSPs’ registry and lists their 
respective trust values calculated from Trust Calculator (TC). CSRD is a registry that enables 
CSP’s to list themselves along with their respective trust values. CSPs need to make sure that they 
register themselves in their specific category based on three service delivery models namely SaaS, 
PaaS and IaaS. The Dynamic Trust Monitor (DTM) keeps watch on the deviating trust values with 
time and transactions dynamically as shown in Figure. 4.1 [86].  
CSRD can help CSCs to opt for the right CSPs according to their need based on brand, 
usefulness of service, user experience and background. CSPs in order to register need to enter all 
their details relating to type of services they provide, since when providing services, specialty of 
their services etc. Other details like user experience, background etc., of any registered CSP can 
be depicted from TC, a transparent module of calculating trust. DTM looks after the changing trust 
values of CSPs that keeps on changing for the dynamic nature of cloud environment [86]. 
 
Figure 4.1. Cloud service registry and discovery with trust calculator [86] 
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Trust Calculator (TC) is where the trust values of CSRD registered CSPs are calculated. 
The calculated trust values are then displayed in CSRD against the respective registered CSPs. 
Trust factor can be calculated from the following formula [119]: 
𝑇(𝑝𝑖) =
𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣(𝑝𝑖) + 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑝𝑖)
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(4.3) 
where 𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣(𝑝𝑖) is the previous trust value of provider 𝑝𝑖 from CSRD, 𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣(𝑝𝑖) is the 
average feedback value of 𝑝𝑖 assigned by other credible providers. 𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑝𝑖) is the average 
feedback value of 𝑝𝑖 assigned by other credible CSC: 
𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣(𝑝𝑖) =
∑ 𝑓𝑏(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛
 
(4.4) 
where 𝑓𝑏(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑗) is the feedback value of provider 𝑃𝑖 assigned by provider 𝑃𝑗. 𝑓𝑏 is the 
average of total of ranges which is between 0 to 5, given to each questions in the feedback.  
𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑝𝑖) =
∑ 𝑓𝑏(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐶𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑛
 
(4.5) 
where 𝑓𝑏(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐶𝑗) is the feedback value of provider 𝑃𝑖 assigned by CSC 𝐶𝑗 and n is the total 
number of CSCs. 
 Raghebi et al. (2013) [87] 
The authors proposed an adaptive method that helps distinguish between malicious and 
reliable CC feedbacks. Figure 4.2 shows the method architecture. As we can see from the figure, 
the trust broker is responsible for evaluating the dependability of any cloud service. The CC 
feedback reliability is based on the combination of the similarity between CC feedbacks for shared 
services and closeness to majority consensus of feedbacks for other services. The trust broker acts 
as a third party to use the proposed trust evaluation method which analyzes the feedbacks and 
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calculates the trust value. This method use both direct and indirect trust. In indirect trust a CC ‘A’ 
wants to evaluate the trust of a CSP ‘C’ whom it has never interacted with before. Besides, ‘A’ 
knows another customer ‘B’ who has interacted directly with the target CSP. In this method, we 
focus on the reliability of the feedback of the middle customer ‘B’. In the first step, it evaluates 
the reliability of a middle customer ‘B’ by comparing its feedbacks for commonly rated services. 
Each customer feedback is weighted based on a newly introduced similarity measure. In the second 
step, it considers all the feedbacks that customer ‘B’ has rated and compare them with the majority 
of feedbacks. This trust evaluation method is defined in section A and B [87]. 
 
Figure 4.2. The overview of a trust method in a cloud architecture [87] 
 
 Fan et al. (2013) [88]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Recommendation Based Trust Management 
Mechanism (RBTM) [88] which is a trust management framework for cloud computing 
environments, and then introduced an effective reliability-based filtering mechanism to ensure the 
reliability of trust feedback for cloud computing services. The filtering mechanism uses two 
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important factors, namely, familiarity and consistency, to filter out unreliable trust feedback. As 
shown in Figure 4.3, this system is divided into two domains: the service provider domain and the 
service user domain. In the service provider domain, the system mainly performs the function of 
connecting a user to the portals of different CSPs. In the service user domain, it mainly performs 
the function of collecting cloud service trust feedback from distributed service users, searching 
reliable users, deriving the real time trust results on the cloud services. This system provides a 
publishing platform of service and trust management information. It also selects, filters, judges 
and aggregates the information so as to connect service users and providers with a view to 
enhancing trust relation. Service providers and users should subscribe to the system through their 
respective entries for service provider domain and user domain in order to obtain a provider ID 
and user ID respectively. Service providers should provide their provider ID, property (individual 
or organization etc.), scale (small, mediate, or large), and other information. Also, for each service, 
the service provider should provide the SLA, which should include performance guarantees, QoS 
and cost, the service functions, and basic guarantees on nonfunctional properties of the services 
[88].  
 
Figure 4.3. The trust management system for cloud services [88] 
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Users will deem a service provider as trustworthy if its services satisfy the advertised SLA 
and other specifications. For users, the system will also create a table of their basic information 
after they subscribe to the system, where they can publish their required information about 
services. After using a service, they are asked to input their trust feedback for the service. This 
method uses the “general trustworthiness” trust feedback given by five grades, i.e., 1 to 5, with 1 
being the most untrustworthy, and 5 the most trustworthy [88]. 
 Noor et al. (2014) [89] 
The authors proposed a trust model named CloudArmor [89], which is a reputation-based 
trust management framework that provides a set of functionalities to deliver Trust as a Service 
(TaaS), which includes a novel protocol to prove the credibility of trust feedbacks and preserve 
users’ privacy, an adaptive and robust credibility model for measuring the credibility of trust 
feedbacks to protect cloud services from malicious users and to compare the trustworthiness of 
cloud services, and an availability model to manage the availability of the decentralized 
implementation of the trust management service [89]. 
The CloudArmor framework is based on the service oriented architecture (SOA), which 
delivers trust as a service. Figure 4.4 depicts the framework, which consists of three different 
layers. The CSP Layer consists of different CSPs who offer one or several cloud services, i.e., IaaS 
(Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service), 
publicly on the Web. Interactions for this layer are considered as cloud service interaction with 
users and TMS, and cloud services advertisements where providers are able to advertise their 
services on the Web. The Trust Management Service Layer consists of several distributed TMS 
nodes which are hosted in multiple cloud environments in different geographical areas. These TMS 
nodes expose interfaces so that users can give their feedback or inquire the trust results in a 
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decentralized way. Interactions for this layer include: i) cloud service interaction with CSPs, ii) 
service advertisement to advertise the trust as a service to users through the Internet, iii) cloud 
service discovery through the Internet to allow users to assess the trust of new cloud services, and 
iv) Zero-Knowledge Credibility Proof Protocol (ZKC2P) interactions enabling TMS to prove the 
credibility of a particular consumer’s feedback. The Cloud Service Consumer Layer consists of 
different users who use cloud services. Interactions for this layer include: service discovery where 
users are able to discover new cloud services and other services through the Internet, trust and 
service interactions where users are able to give their feedback or retrieve the trust results of a 
particular cloud service, and registration where users establish their identity through registering 
their credentials in IdM before using TMS [89]. 
 
Figure 4.4. Architecture of the CloudArmor trust management framework [89] 
 
 Li et al. (2015) [90] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Data-driven and Feedback-Enhanced Trust 
(DFET) [90] trust model which is an enhanced and hierarchical feedback mechanism that can 
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effectively reduce networking risk while improving system dependability. Theoretical analysis 
shows that Data-driven and Feedback-Enhanced Trust (DFET) pattern is highly dependable 
against garnished and bad-mouthing attacks. They also build a prototype system to verify the 
feasibility of DFET pattern and the experiments yield meaningful observations that can facilitate 
the effective utilization of DFET in the large-scale multi-cloud collaborative environment. Figure 
4.5 shows the architecture of this model. Unified Access Portal (UAP) includes the unified cloud 
management and unified cloud service portals. Cloud users open a unified cloud service portal and 
select a trusted service catalog when they would like to use providers. An administrator manages 
virtual servers on the unified cloud management portal. The trust-aware service monitor is located 
between users and cloud sites, providing a unified cloud service portal and a unified cloud 
management portal for a server user and a server administrator, respectively [90].  
 
Figure 4.5. Trust-aware cloud service monitoring service based on large-scale monitoring data 
and feedback enhanced rating aggregation mechanism [90] 
 
The unified cloud service portal creates virtual server templates, which are enrolled in 
advance as service catalogs into a Multiple Cloud Management Platform (MCMP). The MCMP 
module stores all available and trusted services from which it can automatically select highly 
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trusted services to meet user’s requirements. The MCMP creates a service catalog that links with 
a highly trusted resource and then provides this catalog as a trusted resource for the user through 
the unified cloud service portal. Moreover, the MCMP provides a specific management service 
called migration service. In applications, a user often has to migrate one application from one cloud 
site to another more trusted one [90].  
The Cloud Service Connection and Adaptation (CSCA)  encapsulates different application 
programming interfaces (APIs) provided by different CSPs or cloud sites, such that other modules 
of the trust-aware service monitoring architecture only need to be aware of a single set of APIs. 
Distributed Agent Publish and Management (DAPM) monitors the real-time service data of 
allocated resources to guarantee SLA with users. The Overall Trust Degree Aggregation (OTDA) 
module is not only the core of the trust-aware cloud computing system, but is also a major focus 
of this paper. In Feedback-enhanced and Hierarchical Rating Mechanism (FHRM), the high-level 
feedback organization can be defined as other monitors, that is, the whole multiple-cloud market 
has more than one monitor (i.e., TCSM). Thus, multiple cloud monitors form a hierarchical 
feedback system [90].  
 Rizvi et al. (2014) [91] 
The authors developed a trust model named centralize trust model involving CSPs and 
CSUs as well as one or more third-party auditing body to determine a fair score for each service 
provider, using the third party assessment results and the feedback received from each CSU [91]. 
In this model, each entity needs differ when it comes to what it wants from the CSPs. Some entities 
may require more privacy than scalability. Individual entities can then have baseline measurements 
that they can use to decide which provider best suits their needs. When trust is built properly into 
the cloud architecture, it allows for three core qualities. The first is the incentive for responsibility 
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in the cloud setting. This is done by remembering the past actions of a CSP or a CSU. In other 
words, the trust model which evaluates entities trustworthiness based on their past behavior history 
provides incentives for both CSPs and CSUs to behave more responsibly for their actions in the 
cloud [91].  
 Bradai et al. (2013) [92] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Byzantine, Altruistic and Rational (BAR) [92] 
which is a trust model to detect rational and byzantine (malicious) peers in the context of hybrid 
cloud. In this model it is assumed that there are N peers (a finite set of local resources of the 
enterprise and peers allocated from the IaaS cloud computing) executing tasks for the same 
application. Reputation data is needed for the trust evaluation of the peers are stored in the portal. 
It stores the database of collected reputation. Its task is to compute the trust value for each peer 
and make the decision. For that, the portal has three modules. Reputation collector which is 
responsible for retrieving local reputation vectors. Trust manager which is responsible for 
calculating the global trust vector. We can notice in this module that the trust is performed in a 
dynamic and centralized way (in a trusted entity). Decision maker which is responsible for 
deciding for current and future execution. The decision is based on the final trust vector. It consists 
on guiding the scheduler in the application organization. It means that if the trust score is good, 
the scheduler will keep the peer in the execution plan. Each peer in the system has three modules 
and local storage on its executer manager. Evaluation engine which is responsible for a cyclic 
update of evaluation using the model. Execution engine which is responsible for the task of 
execution and result delivery to other peers. Reputation sender which is responsible for sending 
evaluations to the portal [92]. 
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Figure 4.6. BAR architecture details [92] 
 
 Agheli et al. (2014) [93] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Select Service Provider Trust Model [93] which 
is a trust model for service provider selection. This model can help users to choose proper service 
providers according to their needs by calculating final trust. Figure 4.7 shows the architecture of 
the model. In this model Service request layer includes different service receptions which request 
for a special kind of service. The service requester is able to specify the interaction feedback to 
cloud service by calling trust management service. Services’ information layer is a common unit 
for storage of service details and providers should be present. Trust management system is 
responsible for collecting and maintaining of recommendations and keeping scores. The value of 
service providers’ trust is evaluated by this unit and is updated in accordance with the behavior of 
service provider and service receiver [93].  
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Figure 4.7. Select service provider trust model [93] 
 
Direct experience allocates trust values according to the satisfaction level of interaction 
between two entities. Direct Evaluation satisfaction level module is used for evaluation of the 
direct interchange satisfaction level. Scores are allocated according to priority and importance of 
services. Indirect experience is the amount of trust collected by other trustful groups. Evaluation 
module for destructive recommendations recognizes feedback credit. With Initial experience: each 
service is categorized on the basis of initial trust security [93].  
 Zhang et al. (2010) [94] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Application-Oriented Remote Verification 
Trust Model (ARVTM) [94] which is a model that dynamically adjusts the users’ trust value with 
the trust feedback mechanism to determine whether or not the requested resource or service should 
be provided. ARVTM uses the framework named Trust Evaluation Management based on Remote 
Verification (TEMRV). Figure 4.8 shows its components and the information flow among them. 
It is comprised of three parts: trust collection, trust assessment and trust maintenance. Trust 
collection consists of Credential Database (CDB) and Application Information Database (AIDB). 
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Trust assessment is completed by Trust Feedback Compliance Checker (TFCC). Trust 
maintenance contains Operation Monitor (OM), Credit Adjustment Rule Database (CARDB) and 
Evidence Database (EDB) [94].  
 
Figure 4.8. TEMRV framework [94] 
 
The main function of trust collection is to collect and store all kind of basic information. 
CDB is to store various certificates that might be used in access process, including user 
authentication information, etc. AIDB can store the access security requirements of resources or 
services from the entities, as well as with their corresponding application verification contents. 
Trust assessment is responsible for user information verification and trust authorization 
verification. TFC0C uses the application-oriented remote verification mechanism. The result is 
determined by checking in EDB whether the user has any behaviors that violate the trust rules, and 
adjusting the trust value of the user based on rules of CARDB. Trust maintenance uses action 
monitoring to adjust the user’s trust values and reflect the user’s trust status. OM will monitor the 
user’s operation actions after the authorization. Once an error, compromise or attack occurs, the 
information of the operation will be feedback to OM, and the abnormal operation will be recorded 
into EDB. Such information is essential for trustworthiness adjustment, and it also provides a 
42 
 
referential log to track and handle anomaly operations. CARDB stores the trustworthiness 
adjustment rules that are subject to different operations. OM controls the creation, modification, 
and deletion of the rules in CARDB [94]. 
 Liu et al. (2011) [95] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Data Coloring by Cloud Watermarking [95] 
trust model which is using a data coloring method based on cloud watermarking to recognize and 
ensure mutual reputations. The flow chart of data coloring based on cloud watermarking is 
illustrated in Figure. 4.9 Ex is provided by data owner; En and He are produced by negotiation of 
data owner and service provider. Then, a lot of cloud drops will form by forward cloud generator 
and are used to color the user data. When the data are used, the cloud drops are extracted from 
colored data, and Ex, En, and He will be produced by reverse cloud generator. Final color matching 
will complete the confirmation. Data owner and storage service provider negotiate together to 
select En and He, just like the “key”. Taking user print as an example, it is shown as a pixel matrix 
(m × n) where the grey-level value of each pixel ranges between 0 and 255. After traversing the 
matrix line by line from top to bottom, an image, which is Ex of a cloud watermark is obtained. In 
the process of data coloring, the location of the watermark to be embedded and the algorithm for 
embedding are decided by a user s requested security strength and allowable expense. Security 
strength will determine extra storage space, and algorithm complexity will decide time expense of 
data accessing. When users coloring data are used illegally, paint drops could be extracted from 
the data according to the selected embedding algorithm. Then, Ex, En, and He of these paint drops 
are computed by reverse cloud generator. When Ex is compared with the original user paint, the 
confirmation is completed. Because of the universality of data coloring and the basic certainty 
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hiding in the uncertainty represented by cloud model, the process can be applied even to part of 
user s data [95].  
 
Figure 4.9. Flow chart for data coloring based on cloud watermarking [95] 
 
 Kong et al. (2012) [96] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Trust Based Recommendation System in 
Service Oriented Cloud Computing (TRSC) [96] trust model which is a particular mechanism, 
which evaluates CSP services based on the trust of them. In TRSC, the resulting trust value is 
obtained combining direct trust and recommendation trust. Direct trust of a user on a cloud service 
is computed as usual, that is according on the direct interaction. While the recommended trust is 
evaluated taking into account opinions coming from users, or other authority of the field, who are 
trusted by the user, considering that this kind of trust is more reliable. 
 Singh et al. (2014) [97] 
The authors proposed a trust evaluation mechanism which calculates final trust on a service 
provider based on a user’s past experiences with service provider and based on friends and third 
party’s recommendations. 
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In the proposed trust evaluation framework, trust is visualized from three different angles. 
One is consumer’s self-trust with service provider which represents the consumer’s trust on service 
provider based on his/her previous interactions with service provider and experiences felt as a 
result of those interactions. Second is friends’ trust which represents the consumer’s friends’ trust 
on service provider. Friend’s trust is based on that friend’s previous interactions with the service 
provider. Third is independent feedback trust which is acquired from independent third party based 
the evaluation done by that third party. Figure 4.10 shows the pictorial representation of the 
environment envisaged for trust evaluation framework [97]. 
 
Figure 4.10. The pictorial representation of the environment envisaged for trust evaluation 
framework [97] 
 
As per Figure 4.10 a service consumer accesses the services provided by a service provider. 
The services of service provider are monitored by an independent third party (which can be a cloud 
auditor) and monitoring reports are available to consumers to help them make decisions regarding 
the trustworthiness of a service provider. In the environment, there are many consumers and any 
of the consumers can be friends of other consumers as per their preferences. Friends send 
recommendations about service providers. Moreover, recommendations about the trustworthiness 
of any service provider can be asked from a friend if that friend has previously interacted with the 
service provider. Final trust is calculated considering the recommendations from friends, 
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monitoring results from independent third party and taking into account the consumer’s past 
interactions with the service provider [97]. 
 Han et al. (2009) [98]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Cloud Service Recommendation System 
(CSRS) [98] trust model which presents a Cloud service selection framework in the Cloud market 
that uses a recommender system (RS) which helps a user to select the best services from different 
CSP that matches user requirements. The RS recommends a service based on the network QoS 
and Virtual Machine (VM) platform factors of difference CPs. 
The Cloud service RS (CSRS) proposed in this paper recommends the effective resources 
from the Cloud market using QoS and service rank analysis of resources provided by CSPs. QoS 
includes execution time, average execution time, response time, average response time etc. of 
Cloud services. Service-rank (SRank) considers the quality of virtualization hypervisors used by 
different Cloud service platforms, user feedback and cost of services to provide better services. 
The proposed RS for Cloud services will contribute to the research model for Green IT and a use 
to manage the resources efficiently [98]. 
The proposed architecture of Cloud service RS (CSRS) is shown in Figure 4.11. The main 
components of the CSRS include web portal, request manager, resource register, resource 
manager, application specific service, resource monitoring and provisional manager [98].  
Web portal is used by the CPs to register their resources/services to the CSRS system. Also 
user can submit their requirements of Cloud services and get the recommendation results through 
the web portal. When a CP wants to register its resources/services to CSRS system, the request is 
passed to the Request. 
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Figure 4.11. Architecture of CSRS trust model [98] 
 
Manager through the web portal. The Request Manager evaluates each of the resource 
information and sends the register confirmation request to the Resource Register which calculates 
the S-Rank and QoS values of the CP’s and stores all the information in the Resource Repository. 
The Request Manager also handles user requests for Cloud services and provides recommendation 
results through web portal. Resource Manager as a core module of the system controls the market 
system and manages various resources of CPs. It stores meta-data that is the logical organization 
of the resources distributed by the VO (Virtual Organization) in VO repository and the cost of the 
market and measured performance in Policy repository. It has a role to set up the virtual 
environment in the CPs via Provisioning Manager. It also monitors the status of the resources 
through the Resource Monitoring and sends the S-Rank update request to the Resource Register. 
Application Specific Service is used to provide the software services to user directly [98]. 
 Noor et al. (2011) [99] 
The authors overviewed the design and implementation of a Trust as a Service framework. 
The proposed system is based on a credibility model, responsible for distinguishing between the 
believable and the malicious trust feedbacks, taking into account the majority consensus of 
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feedbacks too. In addition to the credibility model, the other salient feature of the discussed 
framework is that it allows trust feedback assessment and storage to be managed distributive, 
avoiding common drawbacks of centralized architectures.  
The proposed framework uses the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to deliver trust as 
a service. SOA and Web services are one of the most important enabling technologies for cloud 
computing in the sense that resources are exposed in clouds as services. In particular, this 
framework uses Web services to span several distributed TMS nodes that expose interfaces so that 
trust participants (i.e., the cloud service consumers) can give their trust feedbacks or inquire about 
the trust results based on SOAP or REST messages. Figure 1 depicts the framework, which consists 
of three different layers, namely the CSP Layer, the Trust Management Service Layer, and the 
Cloud Service Consumer Layer. The CSP Layer consists of different CSPs who provide cloud 
services. The minimum indicative feature that every CSP should have is to provide the 
infrastructure as a service [99]. 
The Trust Management Service Layer. This layer consists of several distributed TMS nodes 
that expose interfaces so that cloud service consumers can give their trust feedbacks or inquire 
about the trust results represents. The Cloud Service Consumer Layer. Finally, this layer consists 
of different cloud service consumers who consume cloud services. For example, a new startup that 
has limited funding can consume cloud services. A cloud service consumer can give trust 
feedbacks of a particular cloud service by invoking the TMS. This framework also contains a 
Registry Service that has several responsibilities including. Service Advertisement: both CSPs and 
the TMS are able to advertise their services through the Service Registry; Service Discovery: the 
TMS and cloud service consumers are able to access the Service Registry to discover services [99]. 
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Figure 4.12. Trust management service architecture [99] 
 
 Fridhous et al. (2011) [100, 101] 
The authors proposed a model for trust formation and evolution based the Quality of 
Service of cloud nodes. Figure 4.13 shows the proposed system that is used to form, evolve and 
manage the trust of computing nodes in a cloud system. The trust formulation unit computes the 
initial trust values based on the type of service and level of service. Service monitor monitors the 
performance of the service provider and informs the trust evolution unit if the service was carried 
out satisfactorily or not. Trust evolution unit keeps track of the current trust values for different 
service types and evolves them based on the feedback received from the service monitor. 
 
Figure 4.13. Trust evaluation system architecture [100] 
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 Wang et al. (2013) [102] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Usability feedback Rating Trust Model. The 
proposed reputation measurement approach of Cloud services contains two phases. The first phase 
is Trust Vector, in which we adopt cloud model to analysis the unstability level of feedback rating. 
The second phase is Calculating Reputation, in which we adopt fuzzy logic to calculate the 
reputation score of each Cloud service. Eventually, the reputation scores are stored that is an 
important criterion for Cloud service systems [102]. 
 
Figure 4.14. Procedures of the reputation measurement approach [102] 
 
4.1.1. Analyzing Reputation Based Trust 
Table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 represents the analysis of Reputation based trust management 
models based on the selected assessment criteria defined in chapter 3. The assessment criteria and 
the cloud computing challenges that each trust feature address are indicated in the tables. In the 
tables  means the trust model does not evaluate the specified assessment criteria and  means 
that it evaluates the specified assessment criteria. Also, there are some assessment criteria that if 
the trust model evaluates them instead of having  as an indicator, it is mentioned how it support 
that criteria such as attack resistance, trust evaluation, trust scope and trust aggregation.  
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Table 4.1. Evaluating Reputation Based Trust Models – Part A 
Challenges 
Lack of 
Confidentiality 
Lack of Reliability 
 Encryption Attack resistance 
Punishment of Agreement 
Violation 
AMRep  
Individual malicious / Malicious pre-trusted peers / 
Collusion 
 
TWFS    
CSRD  Individual malicious  
Raghebi (2013)    
RBTM  Malicious feedback  
CloudArmor 
 Man-in the-Middle (MITM) attack, Collusion, Sybil  
DFET  garnished, bad-mouthing  
Rizvi (2014)    
BAR  malicious peers  
Agheli (2014)    
ARVTM    
Liu (2015)  malicious peers  
TRSC    
Singh (2014)    
CSRS    
TMS    
Firdhous 
(2011) 
   
Wang (2013)  malicious users  
Based on table 4.1, none of the selected reputation based trust models evaluates encryption 
that address lack of confidentiality challenge. In order to find the trust models that address lack of 
reliability, DFET is the only model that evaluates all of the assessment criteria under this category. 
It evaluates punishment and attack resistant assessment criteria. On the other hand, AMRep, 
CSRD, RBTM, CloudArmor, BAR, Liu (2015), and Wang (2013) trust models just evaluate attack 
resistance trust feature. Therefore, the trust consumers who like to use trust models that both 
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evaluate attack resistance and punishment can use DFET otherwise, if they are not concerned about 
punishment, they can use other reputation based trust models that evaluates attack resistance trust 
feature.  
Table 4.2. Evaluating Reputation Based Trust Models – Part B 
Challenges Lack of Identity Management Lack of Privacy 
 Identity Management Trust Bootstrapping Transferability Heterogeneity Security Enabled Trust 
AMRep      
TWFS      
CSRD      
Raghebi 
(2013) 
     
RBTM      
CloudArmor      
DFET      
Rizvi (2014)      
BAR      
Agheli 
(2014) 
     
ARVTM      
Liu (2015)      
TRSC      
Singh (2014)      
CSRS      
TMS      
Firdhous 
(2011) 
     
Wang (2013)      
Table 4.2 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of identity management 
and lack of privacy assessment criteria. Considering lack of identity management, two trust models 
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named BAR and TMS both evaluate identity management and trust bootstrapping. In addition, 
CloudArmor and ARVTM are the Raghebi (2013) that just evaluate identity management trust 
feature and TWFS, RBTM, Rizvi (2014), CSRS and Firdhous (2011) are the trust models that just 
evaluate trust bootstrapping. Therefore, based on the CC concern in case of lack of identity 
management they can choose the trust model that does their required evaluation. Table 4.2 also 
analyzes selected reputation based trust models based on three assessment criteria that address lack 
of privacy. Among all of the studied trust models, just TWFS and CSRD evaluate transferability. 
In addition, none of the trust models evaluate the heterogeneity support and CloudArmor, 
ARVTM, Liu (2015) and Wang (2013) trust models are evaluating security enabled trust. If a CC 
is trying to find a reputation based trust model that address the lack of confidentiality support, 
these trust models can help them. None of the studied trust models evaluate the three selected 
assessment criteria together. Therefore, if lack of privacy is important for a CC, he can choose a 
reputation based trust model based on the trust feature that is more important for him.  
Table 4.3 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of reputation, lack of SLA 
Support and lack of transparency. Considering lack of reputation, CloudArmor, DFET, Rizvi 
(2014), ARVTM, Liu (2015), CSRD evaluate trust based on outside in method which means not 
only they evaluate trust based on CSP reputation but also based on architectural concerns. While, 
other trust models evaluate trust based on black box approach which means they just evaluate trust 
based on CSP reputation. In addition, TRSC, Raghebi (2013), Singh (2014) and Wang (2013) 
evaluates local trust while others evaluate based on global trust and BAR is the only reputation 
based trust model that evaluates trust based on both methods. Furthermore, all trust models 
evaluate reputation enable trust. CloudArmor, DFET, BAR, Liu (2015), TRSC, Singh (2014), 
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CSRS and Wang (2013) can evaluate decentralize trust models while others evaluate centralize 
trust model.  
Table 4.3. Evaluating Reputation Based Trust Models – Part C 
Challenges Lack of Reputation 
Lack of SLA 
Support 
Lack Of 
Transparency 
 
Trust 
evaluation 
Trust Scope 
Reputation 
Enabled Trust 
Trust 
Aggregation 
Trust 
Evidence 
SLA 
Verification 
Transparency 
AMRep Black Box Global  Centralize -   
TWFS Black box Global  Centralize 
Direct / 
Indirect 
  
CSRD Black box Local  Centralize Direct   
Raghebi 
(2013) 
Black box Local  Centralize Indirect   
RBTM Black box Global  Centralize Direct   
CloudArmor Outside in Global  Decentralize Direct   
DFET Outside in Global  Decentralize Direct   
Rizvi (2014) Outside in Global  Centralize Indirect   
BAR Black box Local/Global  Decentralize Direct   
Agheli 
(2014) 
Black box Global  Centralize Direct/Indirect   
ARVTM Outside in Global  Centralize Direct   
Liu (2015) Outside in Global  Decentralize Indirect   
TRSC Black box Global  Decentralize Direct/Indirect   
Singh (2014) Black box Local  Decentralize Indirect   
CSRS Outside-in Global  Centralize Indirect   
TMS Black-box Global  Decentralize Direct/Indirect   
Firdhous 
(2011) 
Black box Global  Centralize Direct   
Wang (2013) Black box Local  Decentralize Direct   
Finally, Raghebi (2013), Rizvi (2014), Liu (2015), Singh (2014), and CSRS are evaluating 
indirect trust evidence, however, TWFS, Agheli (2014), TRSC, TMS and Wang (2013) are 
evaluating both direct and indirect trust models while others evaluate direct trust evidence. By 
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considering lack of SLA support, CSRD, Raghebi (2013), and DFET are having SLA verification 
mechanism. In addition, regarding lack of transparency, CSRD, DFET, TRSC, and TMS are 
evaluating transparency in trust management systems. 
4.2. Authentication Based Trust Models 
As discussed in section 2.2.2 authentication based trust models use encryption and key 
management technologies to establish trust between CCs and CSPs. This category includes trust 
models that ensures the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data on cloud by using 
certificates from standardized body, trust tickets, private and public keys, TPM endorsement keys 
and etc. and evaluates the confidence of CCs regarding the expected behavior of cloud services. 
In this section in order to evaluate authentication based trust models some of the recent trust models 
have been studied and analyzed based on the assessment criteria discussed in chapter 3.  
 Krautheim et al. (2010) [103]  
The authors proposed a trust model called Trusted Virtual Environment Module (TVEM) 
[103] is presented as a software appliance. For cloud environments already provided with Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) virtualization techniques, TVEM introduces better features like improved 
application program interface (API), cryptographic algorithm flexibility, and a configurable 
modular architecture. 
Also a unique Trusted Environment Key is introduced, combining trust from the 
information owner, and the CSP to create a dual root of trust for the TVEM that is distinct for 
every virtual environment and separate from the platforms trust [103].  
Figure 4.15 shows the configuration of a Host Platform (HP) with multiple virtual 
environments that require a TVEM. The virtual environment may be an entire virtualized OS that 
supports many applications or a special purpose virtual environment that performs a single 
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application. The TVEM lies between the hypervisor and its associated VM. The hypervisor must 
be aware of TVEMs and provide support via a TVEM manager. The TVEM manager provides 
mediation for TPM services from each TVEM and other processes that require TPM services. The 
host platform must provide the TVEM manager and allow access for TVEMs. The host platform’s 
TPM is used as the RTS to secure the TVEM’s private information on the HP. A transitive trust 
chain is built from the TPM through the hypervisor and TVEM manager to the TVEM ensuring 
trust in the TVEM is rooted in the hardware trust of the platform [103]. 
 
Figure 4.15. Configuration of a host platform with multiple virtual environments [103] 
 
 Guoyuan (2014) [104] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Mutual Trust Based Access Control (MTBAC) 
which not only considers user's behavior trust and ensure that user's access request poses no 
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malicious threat to cloud server, and also takes cloud service node's credibility into account. Trust 
relationships between users and cloud service nodes are established by mutual trust mechanism 
and only trusted users have access to the Cloud, and simultaneously users can select the most 
credible cloud service nodes [104].  
The physical structure of MTBAC consists of users, Authentication and Authorization 
Center (AAC), cloud service nodes, user's behavior trust database and cloud service node's trust 
database. User represents individuals or organization who request access to cloud services or 
resources. Cloud service nodes are entities that provide services or resources to users in cloud 
computing platform. User's behavior trust database and cloud service node's trust database store 
interact history, behavior information, trust values and trust models of the User and Cloud service 
nodes respectively. According to user's behavior in user's trust database, AAC will detect user's 
behavior in the first place in order to prove user's identical legitimacy and behavior trustworthy. 
And then sort nodes according to trust levels and recommend the best service node for the user. 
AAC verifies user's legitimacy firstly, including identity legitimacy and behavior trust. AAC 
ensures that only when user's trust degree is higher than the trust threshold, user's access request 
can be accepted by cloud server. Afterwards, the most suitable cloud node will be selected to 
provide services according to user's request and node's credibility [104]. 
The access control policy of MTBAC can not only guarantee that access request of users 
could get response, but also ensure that all cloud service nodes can't be attacked or illegally 
occupied by malicious users. The algorithm of MTBAC is as follow [104]: 
1) In the process of resource requesting and service providing, after the user submits 
access request to AAC, AAC first check that the user has a valid authentication token.  
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2) According to the user's identity, AAC start to access user's behavior trust database and 
obtain the user's behavior trust level. Compare the user's trust level with the trust 
threshold, if it is higher than the threshold, turn to step (3); else, refuse to provide 
services to the user.  
3) Read the user's access request, and put all the cloud nodes which could provide the 
corresponding service into the candidate node queue.  
4) Select the best service node in the candidate node queue and give the user the service 
access right. 
5) The best service node provides services to the user and then updates user's trust degree. 
 Manuel et al. (2009) [105]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Grid and Cloud Trust Model which is a trust 
model that is integrated with CARE resource broker [104]. The proposed trust model can support 
both grid and cloud systems. The resource broker has been implemented with Kerberos Based 
Authentication Module and PERMIS Role Based Authorization Module to enhance the security 
measure of the broker compared to the conventional security mechanism incorporated in it. 
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol. It allows nodes communicating over a non-secure 
network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner. Kerberos is aimed primarily at 
a client-server model, and it provides mutual authentication between the user and the server to 
verify each other's identity. PERMIS is a policy controlled role based authorization system that 
uses digitally signed X.509 attribute certificates or Kerberos tickets to hold user's roles/attributes. 
The PERMIS based authorization makes the decision for the user's access to be granted or denied 
based on the policy for the target domain [105]. 
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The architecture for Trust Management System for Grid and Cloud resources has been 
shown in Figure 4.17. The model computes trust using three main components namely, Security 
Level Evaluator, Feedback Evaluator and Reputation Trust Evaluator. Security Level Evaluation 
has been carried out based on authentication type, authorization type and self-security competence 
mechanism. Multiple authentication, authorization mechanism and self-security competence 
mechanisms are supported. Depending on the strength of individual mechanism, different grades 
are provided for trust value. Feedback Evaluation also goes through three different stages namely 
feedback collection, feedback verification and feedback updating. The Reputation Trust Evaluator 
computes the trust values of the grid/cloud resources based on their capabilities based on 
computational parameters and network parameters. Finally the overall trust value has been 
computed taking the arithmetic sum of all the individual trust values computed.  
 
Figure 4.16. Grid and cloud resource trust model architecture [105] 
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 Wang et al. (2010) [106] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Family-gene Based model for Cloud Trust 
(FBCT) which is a cloud trust model based on family gene and confirms family blood relation 
according to family gene. The family gene model is divided into three stages. The initialization of 
family gene system in cloud, the identification of family gene in cloud, and the assignment of 
family gene. In the initialization stage the ancestor cloud node of the whole cloud family trust is 
established and Family gene and aberrance gene of the ancestor cloud node are produced. The 
process of the ancestor of cloud family generates a new family member is as follows: 1) A new 
node is created. 2) The node family gene is generated according to the ancestor aberrance gene, 
the registration information of the member. The ancestor assigns the aberrance gene of node. The 
node member gene is produced. 3) The new member is take on as "child", "visitor", or "the 
ancestor" according to the type of a child [106]. Figure 4.18 shows the FBCT model [105]. 
 
Figure 4.17. Cloud trust model based on family gene [106] 
 
In the identification phase firstly the ancestral aberrance gene of cloud family members are 
obtained and signature information from its aberrance gene are extracted. Secondly it will be 
decrypted with the private key. Then that user’s family gene is extracted and the user's family gene 
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code are compared with the deciphered aberrance gene code. If both codes are equal, visitor is 
considered as the family member. 
In the assignment of Family gene system gene stage examining agent confirms that the 
gene belongs to the family. If the visitor is a new user, the ancestor produce a corresponding family 
gene and an aberrance gene while the ancestor is creating a new family member node for it. If 
there has been the visitor, a privilege level and a gene role is assigned to the user. The gene role is 
endowed a certain privilege and behavior (read, write). 
Figure 4.19 represents the trust Relationship between cloud family members. Users of the 
brothers in the same class trust each other therefore they can visit each other, but the relation of 
the brothers' kid (cousinly trust) is delivery-trust at a certain time. The relation of the brothers' kid 
is shown in the right view in the Figure 4.19. At a moment, If F trust E, namely E→F, E can visit 
F at this time. And then S is a child of F, so according to genetic trust relation, then as long as the 
father trust is satisfied, the sub trust will be satisfied. The S trusts F, F→S. At this time E→F, the 
S trusts E, namely E→S, the E can visit S, a child of F. But the E does not believe F at this time, 
so the deliver can't be contrary. If E believes F, trust can be delivered according to this principle 
[106]. 
 
Figure 4.18. Trust relationship between family members [106] 
 
 Wan et al. (2011) [107] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Hierarchical Attribute Set Based Encryption 
(HASBE) [107] which is a full-fledged access control scheme for cloud computing. The HASBE 
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scheme seamlessly incorporates a hierarchical structure of system users by applying a delegation 
algorithm to ASBE. HASBE not only supports compound attributes due to flexible attribute set 
combinations, but also achieves efficient user revocation because of multiple value assignments 
of attributes [107].  
Figure 4.20 shows the hierarchical structure of system users. HASBE model consists of a 
trusted authority, multiple domain authorities, and numerous users corresponding to data owners 
and data consumers. The trusted authority is responsible for generating and distributing system 
parameters and root master keys as well as authorizing the top-level domain authorities. A domain 
authority is responsible for delegating keys to subordinate domain authorities at the next level or 
users in its domain. Each user in the system is assigned a key structure which specifies the 
attributes associated with the user’s decryption key [107]. 
 
Figure 4.19. Hierarchical structure of HASBE system users [107] 
 
Zhiguo Wan et al. believe that HASBE achieves great scalability, can support compound 
attributes and multiple numerical assignments for a given attribute conveniently, can easily achieve 
fine-grained access control, has efficient user revocation, a more natural access control system 
[107].  
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 Shen et al. (2010) [108, 109] 
The authors have analyzed the security of cloud computing environment and described the 
function of trusted computing platform in cloud computing [108, 109]. They have also proposed a 
method named Trusted Platform Software Stack (TSS) to evaluate the security and dependability 
of cloud computing integrating the Trusted Computing Platform (TCP) into the cloud computing 
system. The TCP has been used in authentication, confidentiality and integrity in cloud computing 
environment.  
 
Figure 4.20. TSS architecture for cloud computing based on TCP [108] 
 
TSS components are the major parts of the TCP enabled cloud computing. It provides 
fundamental resources to support the TPM. In this design, TSS should be a bridge between the up-
application and the low-hardware. As depicted in Figure 4.6, TSS includes two layers, the TSS 
service provider (TSP) and TSS core services (TCS). The applications call the function of TSP. 
TSP provides some basic security function modules. These basic modules send calls to TCS. Then 
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TSS converts these calls to according TPM instructions. Since TPM is hardware, the TCG Device 
Driver Library (TDDL) is necessary. TDDL convert the calls from TCS to the TPM orders. After 
the TPM process the order, it will return the results up forward. Each layer gets results from low 
layer and coverts them to responding results that the up layer needs [108]. 
 Yong et al. (2010) [110]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Multi-Tenancy Trusted Computing 
Environment Model (MTCEM) [110] which is a model for cloud computing [110]. Since cloud 
facilities belong to multiple stakeholders such as CSPs and CCs, they belong to multiple security 
domain and server different security subjects simultaneously. The different stakeholders may be 
driven by different motives such as best service, maximization of the return on investment and 
hence may work detrimental to the other party involved. Hence cloud computing should have the 
capability to compartmentalize each CC and CSP and support security duty separation defining 
clear and seamless security responsibility boundaries for CSP and CCs.  
MTCEM has been designed as two-level hierarchy transitive trust chain model which 
supports the security duty separation and supports three types of distinct stakeholders namely, 
CSP, CCs and auditors. In this model, CSP assume the responsibilities to keep infrastructures 
trusted while the CC assumes responsibility starting from the guest OS which installed by the CC 
on the Virtual Machines provided by the CSP. The auditor monitors the services provided by the 
CSP on behalf of the CCs. The authors have implemented a prototype system to prove that 
MTCEM is capable of being implemented on commercial hardware and software. But no 
evaluation of the prototype on performance has been presented. Figure 4.7 shows the MTCEM 
architecture. 
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Figure 4.21. MTCEM [110] 
 
 Ma et al. (2012) [111] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Trusted VM Clone Model (TVMCM) [111] 
which is consisted of two individual models TCVMM and TCVDM where TCVMM ensures the 
security when cloning the memory of VM and TCVDM ensures the security when cloning the disk 
of VM. TVMCM resolves three problems: the identities verification of involved servers; the 
attestation of source VM and destination VM; the protection of integrity of transmitted data. 
TVCM relies on the concept developed in Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and take use of 
hardware elements such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the emulated TPM for virtual 
machines vTPM is involved.  
There are three functions provided by TCVMM: first, before the cloning procedure begins, 
SL and SR should be able to authenticate the identity of each other; second, VMS should be able to 
authenticate the identity of newly generated VM VMD; finally, during the procedure, SR should be 
able to authenticate the memory data transmitted from SL. 
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Figure 4.22. TCVMM architecture [111] 
 
There are two phases in TCVMM: phase 1 is an attestation process between servers and 
VMS, and phase 2 is integrity measurement of memory pages during the cloning process. Figure 
4.24 shows the architecture of TCVMM [111]. 
In TCVDM before the cloning process start the identities of involved entities have been 
attested. Unlike virtual memory, virtual disks are always with big size and hard to be transferred 
over network. To reduce the overhead, the authors of this thesis have designed a mechanism to 
clone virtual disk in TCVDM. When VMD is generated, an empty virtual disk is assigned to it and 
a bitmap is associated to it. This bitmap indicates the status of every data block and with this 
bitmap the virtual disks of VMS and VMD are logically connected. VMD determines how to 
read/write data from/to its virtual disk by inquiring this bitmap. When VMD reads data from local 
virtual disk, the data will be transferred from the virtual disk owned by VMS over the network. 
During the cloning process, VMS execute the write operation to its virtual disk should be reflected 
to VMD’s virtual disk. So when VMS writes data to its own virtual disk, VMD will write the same 
content to the same block of VMD’s virtual disk. So the security issue goes to verify the integrity 
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of data transmitted from VMS before VMD use the data. Simply, this process is like memory 
integrity verification: before the data is transmitted, it will be hashed and vTPMS will use its AIK 
to sign the hash value which will be sent to VMD with hashed value and the data itself. By checking 
the hash value of received data, VMD determines to trust the data or not. This mechanism ensures 
the efficiency of TCVDM. The above figure 4.24 illustrates the process of TCVDM [111]. 
 
Figure 4.23. TCVDM process [111] 
 
 Kashif et al. (2015) [112] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Distributed Trust Protocol (DTP) [112] which 
offers the opportunity to the consumer to take part in securing the VM. The proposed protocol is 
distributed between the provider and the consumer. In the protocol client stores the hash values of 
VM components (BIOS, Boot Loader and OS) in its Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) of 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) at client side. Likewise, in Trusted Boot Process, in which TPM 
measures (hashes) all the software and firmware components, including the BIOS, boot loader, 
and operating system kernel etc. before they are loaded and stores hash values in PCRs of TPM. 
In this DTP, TPM at consumer side is linked with VM hosted at provider side. By doing so, 
consumer VM will be booted according Trusted Computing Group (TCG)’s Trusted Boot Process. 
Hence integrity of VM can be checked by utilizing consumer's infrastructure [112].  
This model is consist of three steps. In the step 1 of protocol, consumer initiates 
communication by sending nonce N and his public part of his Attestation Identity Key (AIKpub) 
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and this complete message is encrypted with the public key of provider (Ppub). In the next step 
session key is encrypted with the AIKpub so that the session should be dedicated to the consumer, 
and the whole message is encrypted with the private key of provider (Ppr). So that it can be said 
that this message has come from the provider. In the third step, user VM at provider side is prepared 
when consumer starts its VM, it gets booted according to the TCG's Trusted Boot Process. In the 
boot process of VM digest value of the VM components (BIOS, Boot Loader, Kernel, OS etc.) are 
calculated with support of consumer's TPM and these values are sent to the consumer by 
encrypting the message with the AIKpub After some period of time when user gets the VM restarted 
all the measurements of VM components are again computed and matched with previous values. 
If the measurement values are found to be same the VM starts normally otherwise consumer is 
notified regarding the tempering of VM. Figure 4.24, graphically presents the process of the VM 
integrity checking protocol [112]. 
 
Figure 4.24. Distributed trust protocol [112] 
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 Han et al. (2010) [113]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Improved Trusted Cloud Computing Platform 
Model (Improved TCCP) which is used Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) and Privacy CA 
scheme to evaluate the anonymity and availability of the TCCP model. This model ensures the 
confidentially and the integrity of a CC's VM, and is able to solve the dependence issue on the 
Trusted Coordinator (TC) [113]. 
The TCCP includes two components: a TVMM and a TC. A TVMM adopts the 
technologies from trusted system, hence is able to protect its own confidentiality and integrity. 
According to different demands of CCs, OS can choose to run in a standard virtual machine 
associates with a unique vTPM instance ("open-box trusted VM") which has the trusted computing 
functionality, or a closed-box virtual machine associates with a unique vTPM instance("closed-
box trusted VM"). Figure 4.19 shows the TCCP architecture. In this picture the TC Manager 
(TCM) makes the connection between the TC and the CC. The role of managing the nodes will be 
transferred to the Trusted Node (TN) itself based on the neutral feature of the TPM. Every node 
can link with any other nodes in the same zone through the Cluster Controller (CC). TNs in light 
blue are ordinary trusted nodes, while green TNs are selected as privacy Certification Authority 
(CAs) by the TC, each of them manages a portion of TNs. Green TNs contact with each other 
through the secretive dark blue TN. The reason why we use multiple green TNs is that a zone in 
the cloud contains a very large number of nodes [113].  
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Figure 4.25. The TCCP architecture [113] 
 
 Navneet et al. (2013) [114]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Effiecient Watermarking Technique [114], 
which is an efficient approach for security of cloud using watermarking technique. Their method 
ensures that the attacks involved in cloud computing such as distributed denial of services, cloud 
malware injection attack, side channel attack can be avoided up to some extent. Also, it ensures 
that even if the data is steeled by an intruder or third party then also the copyright protection is 
achieved as the watermarking is done by shifting the coefficient [114].  
The proposed algorithm transforms original image X into 256×256 standard image as the 
original image, pick up the decomposed component get a 128×128 image where the decomposed 
low frequency coefficient matrix is A (128×128). For an added watermark equally distributed in 
128×128 pixel image, matrix A is blocked by 8×8 size and then make DCT for each block, choose 
the first value in the matrix composed of DCT transformed coefficient of each block as 
𝐹𝑛(1,1) (1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 1024). Read the binary watermark (1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 1024) firstly according to 
positive direction Z scanning (from left to right and from upper to lower), transform watermark 
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image to the sequence {𝑊𝑘} as the length of N, create 0~𝑁 − 10 random sequence {𝑟𝑗} as random 
seed of key K and increase it to {𝑊𝑘} sequence to create a new watermark sequence {𝑊𝑘}. The 
new watermark is embedded in 𝐹𝑛(1,1). This embedding algorithm ensures that coefficient with 
larger amplitude in original chart field corresponds to watermark image DCT with larger 
amplitude. Another issue is that DCT coefficient is comprised watermark image with low 
frequency information. Hence the image will be secured in the data centers where there is a lack 
of trust among users and data owners the DCT will work as the key factor in providing robustness 
against distortion attacks as well as other security threatening attacks [114]. 
 I.Sudha et al. (2014) [115] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Hash algorithm [115] which is a method of 
evaluating security by using HASH algorithm for the periodic authentication to ensure whether the 
legitimate users are accessing the data. The proposed system has the most secure authentication 
mechanism in accessing the data because, a periodic authentication is made to ensure whether the 
legitimate users are accessing the data in the cloud. In the existing system using RSA algorithm, 
the key is generated to ensure whether the legitimate users are accessing the data in the cloud and 
continuous monitoring will be taken by providing periodic authentication. In this method it first 
produces the hash values for accessing data or for security. A hash value is a number generated 
from a string of text. The hash is substantially smaller than the text itself, and is generated by a 
formula in such a way that it is extremely unlikely that some other text will produce the same hash 
value. Then the sender generates a hash of the message, encrypts it, and sends it with the message 
itself. The recipient then decrypts both the message and the hash, produces another hash from the 
received message, and compares the two hashes. If they're the same, there is a very high probability 
that the message was transmitted intact [115].  
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 Hwang et al. (2012) [116] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Secure Resources and Data Coloring is a trust-
management scheme augmented with data coloring and software watermarking. It is using a trust-
overlay network over multiple data centers to implement a reputation system for establishing trust 
between service providers and data owners. Data coloring and software watermarking techniques 
protect shared data objects and massively distributed software modules. These techniques 
safeguard multi-way authentications, enable single sign-on in the cloud, and tighten access control 
for sensitive data in both public and private clouds [116].  
This model has two layers of trust overlays (Figure 4.26). At the bottom layer is the trust 
overlay for distributed trust negotiation and reputation aggregation over multiple resource sites. 
This layer handles user or server authentication, access authorization, trust delegation, and data 
integrity control. The upper trust overlay deals with worm signature generation, intrusion 
detection, anomaly detection, DDoS defense, piracy prevention, and so on. These two layers 
facilitate worm containment and IDSs to protect against virus, worm, and DDoS attacks [116]. 
 
Figure 4.26. Distributed-Hash-Table (DHT)-based trust overlay networks [116] 
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This model uses data coloring or watermarking at the software file or data object level to 
segregate user access and insulate sensitive information from provider access. The coloring 
process uses three data characteristics to generate the color: the Expected value (Ex) depends on 
the data content, whereas Entropy (En) and Hyperentropy (He) add randomness or uncertainty, 
which are independent of the data content and known only to the data owner. Figure 4.27(a) shows 
the forward and backward color-generation processes. This model has added the cloud drops (data 
colors) into the input photo (left) and removed color to restore the original photo (right).  Figure 
4.27(b) shows the details involved in the color-matching process. Figure 4.27(b) shows the details 
involved in the color-matching process, which aims to associate a colored data object with its 
owner, whose user identification is also colored with the same Ex, En, and He identification 
characteristics. The color-matching process assures that colors applied to user identification match 
the data colors [103].  
 
Figure 4.27. Data coloring and water marking technique. (a) forward and backward data coloring 
processes by adding or removing unique cloud drops (colors) in data objects. (b) Data coloring 
and user identification color matching through trust negotiation [116] 
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4.2.1. Analyzing Authentication Based Trust 
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 represent the analysis of authentication based trust models based 
on the selected assessment criteria defined in chapter 3. The assessment criteria and the cloud 
computing challenges that each trust feature address are indicated in the tables. In the tables  
means the trust model does not evaluate the specified assessment criteria and  means that it 
evaluates the specified assessment criteria. Also, there are some assessment criteria that if the trust 
model evaluates them instead of having  as an indicator, it is mentioned how it support that 
criteria such as attack resistance, trust evaluation, trust scope and trust aggregation.  
Table 4.4. Evaluating Authentication Based Trust Models – Part A 
Challenges 
Lack of 
Confidentiality 
Lack of Reliability 
 Encryption Attack resistance 
Punishment of Agreement 
Violation 
TVEM AIK SHA1 collision attacks  
MTBAC PKI Individual malicious / Malicious pre-trusted peers  
Manuel (2009) 
Kerberos and 
PERMIS 
  
FBCT PKI   
HASBE PKI   
TSS PKI   
MTCEM AIK   
TVMCM AIK Individual malicious  
DTP PKI 
Malicious Provider / VM Introspection / Hypervisor 
vulnerabilities / Root kit 
 
Improved 
TCCP 
PKI Rudolph attack  
Navneet 
(2013) 
PKI   
I.Sudha (2014) RSA cryptanalytic attack  
Hwang (2012) PKI Worm containment/ DDoS  
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Based on table 4.4, all of the selected reputation based trust models evaluates encryption 
that address lack of confidentiality challenge. In order to find the trust models that address lack of 
reliability, TVEM, MTBAC, Unstable Feedback Rating Trust Model, TVMCM, DTP, Improved 
TCCP, I.Sudha (2014) and Hwang (2012) are the trust models that evaluate attack resistance. 
MTCEM is the only model that evaluates punishment of agreement violation.  Therefore, the trust 
consumers who like to use trust models that both evaluate lack of confidentiality in cloud services 
can use any of the authentication based trust models. However, if they want to evaluate lack of 
reliability along with confidentiality, they need to decide whether attack residence or punishment 
of agreement violation is more important for them. Table 4.5 analyzes trust models that evaluate 
trust based on lack of identity management and lack of privacy assessment criteria. Considering 
lack of identity management, MTBAC, HASBE, MTCEM, DTP, Improved TCCP, and Hwang 
(2012) and TMS are the trust models that both evaluate identity management and trust 
bootstrapping. In addition, Secure Resource and Data Coloring, Manuel (2009), FBCT, TSS, 
MTCEM, and I.Sudha (2014) trust models are the reputation based trust models that just evaluate 
identity management trust feature. Therefore, based on the CC concern in case of lack of identity 
management they can choose the trust model that does their required evaluation. Table 4.5 also 
analyzes selected reputation based trust models based on three assessment criteria that address lack 
of privacy. Among all of the studied authentication based trust models, just Manuel (2009) and 
Improved TCCP evaluate transferability.  
In addition, Manuel (2009) and HASBE trust models evaluate the heterogeneity support 
and all of the authentication based trust models are evaluating security enabled trust. Just Manuel 
(2009) evaluate the three selected assessment criteria together. Therefore, if lack of privacy is 
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important for a CC, he can choose an authentication based trust model based on the trust feature 
that is important for him. 
Table 4.5. Evaluating Authentication Based Trust Models – Part B 
Challenges Lack of Identity Management Lack of Privacy 
 Identity Management Trust Bootstrapping Transferability Heterogeneity Security Enabled Trust 
TVEM      
MTBAC      
Manuel 
(2009) 
     
FBCT      
HASBE      
TSS      
MTCEM      
TVMCM      
DTP      
Improved 
TCCP 
     
Navneet 
(2013) 
     
I.Sudha 
(2014) 
     
Hwang 
(2012) 
     
Table 4.6 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of trust on CSPs, lack of 
SLA Support and lack of transparency. Considering lack of reputation, Secure Resource and Data 
Coloring and Hwang (2012) evaluate trust based on outside in approach. While, MTBAC, Manuel 
(2009), and Unstable feedback rating trust model are evaluating trust based on black box approach 
and other trust models are evaluating trust based on inside out approach. In addition, Unstable 
feedback rating trust model evaluates local trust while Secure Resource and Data Coloring, 
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MTBAC, Manuel (2009) are evaluating trust based on global trust and other trust models do not 
evaluate any trust scope. Furthermore, Secure Resource and Data Coloring, MTBAC, Manuel 
(2009), Unstable Feedback Rating Trust Models evaluate reputation enable trust. Secure Resource 
and Data Coloring, Manuel (2009), Unstable Feedback Rating Trust Model and Hwang (2012) can 
evaluate decentralize trust models while MTBAC evaluates centralize trust model.  
Table 4.6. Evaluating Authentication Based Trust Models – Part C 
Challenges Lack of Trust on CSPs 
Lack of 
SLA 
Support 
Lack Of 
Transparency 
 
Trust 
evaluation 
Trust Scope 
Reputation 
Enabled Trust 
Trust 
Aggregation 
Trust Evidence 
SLA 
Verification 
Transparency 
TVEM Outside in Global  Decentralize Direct   
MTBAC Black box Global  Centralize 
Direct / Indirect 
Recommendation 
  
Manuel (2009) Black box Global  Decentralize -   
FBCT Inside-out -  - Indirect   
HASBE Inside-out -  - Direct   
TSS Inside-out -  - -   
MTCEM Inside-out -  - Direct   
TVMCM Inside-out -  - -   
DTP Inside-out -  - Direct   
Improved 
TCCP 
Inside-out -  - Direct / Indirect   
Navneet 
(2013) 
Inside-out -  - Indirect   
I.Sudha (2014) Inside-out -  - Indirect   
Hwang (2012) Outside-in Global  Decentralize Direct   
Finally, Secure Resource and Data Coloring, Unstable Feedback Rating Trust Models, 
HASBE, MTCEM, DTP, and Hwang (2012) are evaluating direct trust evidence, however, FBCT, 
Navuneet (2013) and I.Sudha (2014) are evaluating indirect trust evidence and MTBAC and 
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Improved TCCP evaluate both direct and indirect trust models. By considering lack of SLA 
support, just I.Sudha (2014) trust model has SLA verification mechanism. In addition, regarding 
lack of transparency, FBCT, MTCEM, Hwang (2012) are evaluating transparency in trust 
management systems.    
4.3. SLA-Based Trust 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, SLA based trust models are based on contracts and 
agreements signed by CSPs for the delivery of different services to CCs. The trust models in this 
category are evaluating CSPs based on the security and quality of service attributes the CSPs 
included in the SLA. In this section in order to evaluate SLA based trust models some of the recent 
trust models have been studied and analyzed based on the assessment criteria discussed in chapter 
3.  
 Alhamad et al. (2010) [117]  
The authors evaluates cloud services in order to help cloud users select the most reliable 
resources. It recommends the most related and trusted resources from various CSPs. The most 
related services mean the services which match all the main functional requirements of the desired 
service. This model uses the SLA management and trust techniques to provide a reliable model to 
select the best available provider among various CSPs to fulfil both types of requirements [117]. 
Figure 4.28 shows the SLA-based trust model architecture which includes SLA agent, 
cloud services directory, CSPs, and CC entities. The responsibilities of the SLA agent is are: 
Grouping CCs according to different classes based on business needs, Designing SLA metrics 
based on the consumers’ needs, Negotiating with CSPs, Selecting CSPs based on non-functional 
requirements, Monitoring business activities for consumers, Monitoring SLA parameters. The CC 
is the entity who requests the external execution of one or more services. A CC is required to pay 
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the bill upon completed execution of services based on a well-defined model of prices. Trust 
management manages the trust relationships between CSPs and also the other users of cloud 
services. Cloud services directory is a directory that helps CCs to find the services they require. 
CSPs are the entities who own the cloud infrastructure and provide cloud services for consumers 
[117]. 
The first step of the protocol in this model is that cloud services must present their services 
in the cloud services directory. So, any consumer can easily find a suitable provider using the 
functional requirements discovery process. Then CCs use the discovery operation to find the 
related providers who are able to fulfil the consumers’ requirements. The list of providers must be 
submitted to the trust management system to filter out non-trusted providers using credibility 
values and the reports of the SLA agent. Then a trusted list of CSPs should be sent to the SLA 
agent together with more details about business objectives. When CCs submit the request for cloud 
services, they will wait to get the Id of CSP with all details of SLA agreements. If the consumers 
agree to continue the contract, they will be asked to sign the SLA with the SLA agent and start to 
communicate with the selected provider [117]. 
The authors have proposed only the model and no implementation or evaluation has been 
developed or described. Hence the each and every module will have to be evaluated for their 
functionality and the effectiveness and finally the overall model will have to be evaluated for its 
effectiveness. 
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Figure 4.28. SLA-based trust model for cloud computing [117] 
 
 Hammadi et al. (2012) [118] 
The authors proposed a trust model named SLA Assurance which is a framework which 
consists of a Third-Party Service Level Agreement monitor (TP SLA Monitor) which is a service 
provider that monitors near real-time performance of service provider based on the SLA. The TP 
SLA Monitor consists of reputation assessment module and risk assessment module to meet QoS 
assessment. These two modules are independent but they complement each other. Figure 4.29 
shows how this model works. First the TP SLA Monitor should define the total time space for 
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which QoS has to be assessed. Then it divides this time space into pre-interaction and post-
interaction time phases. QoS evaluation in pre-interaction time phase is achieved by using 
reputation assessment methodology by soliciting the recommendations given by Recommending 
Users (RU). RU in this framework is a group of users who received a reputation query from a 
consumer and they reply on the basis of their past experiences with the service provider. The TP 
SLA Monitor aggregates the opinions of RU to reach the final reputation value of the service 
provider. This reputation value then can be used to determine near real-time assessment of SLA 
parameters in the post-interaction time phase using risk assessment methodology [118]. 
 
Figure 4.29. SLA monitoring framework [118] 
 
Figure 4.30 shows the process of a reputation assessment request from a consumer. In this 
process the TP SLA Monitor sends a reputation query about a service provider’s reputation to a 
network of RU. Then the TP SLA monitor has previously solicited these RU in the past and stores 
their credibility values in its information repository. Credibility here is defined as the 
trustworthiness of the opinion of a RU. It is represented on a scale of [0, 5]. Only those RU reply 
to the reputation query who have interacted with the service provider in the same context in which 
consumer wants to interact with the service provider. The reputation query reply from each RU 
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contains the trust value assigned to the service provider on the basis of its past interaction with that 
service provider and the time in which this interaction has occurred [118]. When a RU shares this 
trust value with TP SLA Monitor, this value is called Recommendation Opinions. Time factor is 
important since a RU can have multiple interactions with the same service provider in the same 
context but in different time slots. The time factor can be represented by a time delay which 
indicates the time elapsed since the last interaction of a RU with the service provider and we 
represent time delay on a scale of [0,5].  
 
Figure 4.30. Pre-interaction time phase assessment model [118] 
 
For each reputation query response received from a RU, the TP SLA Monitor needs to 
consolidate credibility value, time delay value and the Recommendation Opinion. The outcome of 
this consolidation is the reputation of the service provider provided by a RU. After consolidating 
these factors for each RU, the TP SLA Monitor then needs to aggregate all reputations by all RU 
involved in the reputation query. It will give the final reputation value for a service provider [133]. 
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 Chakraborty et al. (2012) [119] 
The authors proposed a trust model named SLA trustworthiness framework which helps a 
CC to estimate trustworthiness of a CSP. The main component of the framework is a ‘trust 
evaluation engine’ that evaluates consumer’s trust on the CSP. Figure 4.31 illustrates the 
architecture of the framework, followed by descriptions of the components [119]. 
 
Figure 4.31. Architecture of the framework [119] 
 
CSP is an entity who is accountable for the services provided through that cloud. CC is an 
entity which has job(s) to execute and seeks service from a CSP. Evaluator obtains and evaluates 
parameters mentioned to estimate trustworthiness of the CSP. Parameter extractor examines SLA 
and other documents and extracts the pre-SLA parameters. It also analyzes archived session logs 
to extract post-SLA parameters. Trust calculator is the module which actually evaluates the 
parameters and calculates trust. Session-log files stores log files containing interaction histories of 
all sessions between a consumer and the cloud [119]. 
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Figure 4.32 shows a top view of the total process. Consumer’s trust engine receives SLA 
from CSP. The trust engine sends, if needed, a request for more documents regarding the services. 
This step is optional as not all consumers will require this step. The CSP responds back with new 
or updated documents. This step is executed only if the previous step has been executed. The trust 
engine extracts the parameters. If needed, the trust engine sends the SLA and other documents to 
the evaluator. The evaluator, who is a third party expert, examines these documents and extracts 
parameters for trust estimation. The evaluator supplies the extracted parameter to the trust engine 
[119]. 
 
Figure 4.32. Top view of trust estimation steps [119] 
 
The internal working of the trust engine, which worked as a black box in the first layer, is 
depicted in Figure 4.33.The parameter extractor receives information (SLA and other documents) 
about the parameters from CSP. It extracts parameters with the help of consumer’s trust evaluation 
authentication base. Once a relationship has been established between the CSP and the consumer, 
the parameter extractor module receives session-logs and extract trust parameters. At this step it 
consults the authentication base as well. These parameters are passed to the trust calculator. The 
trust calculator may also receive trust parameters from the evaluator. It then evaluates the 
parameters and calculates trustworthiness with the aid of the authentication base. The 
authentication base is updated or tuned using information received from session log archive [119]. 
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Figure 4.33. Trust estimation steps inside the trust engine [119] 
 
 Jules et al. (2014) [120] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Probabilistic Ontology Driven Trust Model 
which is allows the CC to choose a trusted provider based on its reputation calculated using a 
Bayesian network and continuously updated via a Cloud directory. Their model use a smart and 
dynamic SLA scheme that uses a probabilistic ontology capable of detecting potential violations 
of contract parameters; in addition, it alerts the service provider about these violations [120].   
This model contains a reputation based trust module which classifies CSPs based on the 
probability (i.e., trust level) of each provider in violating the SLA; this probability is computed 
using a Bayesian inference engine that relies on historical data and measurements of low-level 
metrics and can be calculated from the following formula [120]: 
p(H|D) =  
p(D|H). p(H)
p(D)
 
(4.6) 
Where 𝑝(𝐻|𝐷) is the posterior probability of H given knowledge data D; 𝑝(𝐻) is the prior 
probability for H; 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) is the likelihood probability of H given D; and 𝑝(𝐷) is the probability 
that would have happened whether or not H is true. 
In this model an autonomous agent is used which assesses the reputation of a provider 
using quantitative parameters like available resources and saved session log files. To measure the 
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trust level of a provider, the SLA parameters need to be extracted, these parameters are defining 
the QoS offered by the provider to meet the expectations of its CCs. Then, map the low-level 
metrics to high-level SLA parameters, hence they are available and used for calculations. In this 
model two types of mapping is used.  One of them is simple mapping which is a one-to-one 
correspondence. For example, disk space is mapped to storage in SLA; and the second one is 
complex mapping which is many to-one mapping [120]. 
 Lianyong et al. (2014) [121]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Fluctuant QoS and Flexible SLA (FL-FL) which 
is based on cloud service historical records with fluctuant QoS and flexible SLA. The main idea 
of FL-FL [121] is: First, calculate user’s satisfaction degrees towards the criteria in historical 
record by comparing fluctuant QoS and flexible SLA over. Second, calculate user’s satisfaction 
degree towards historical record by integrating the obtained values. Third, the trust of is calculated 
by synthesizing users’ satisfaction degrees towards historical records. The trust of a cloud service 
in this model is calculated by the following formula [121]: 
TRUSTWS =∑∑wj
m
J=1
∗ Sat_degree(ws, HRi, qj)
L
i=1
 
(4.7) 
where 𝑤𝑠 is the cloud service, 𝐻𝑅𝑖 is the historic record and 𝑞𝑗 is the criteria.  
Sat_degree(ws, HRi, qj) =
{
 
 
 
 
−1, if MAX(f(t)) > PeakSLA
−1, if ∫ (OverallSLA − f(t)) dt < 0
T
0
∫ (OverallSLA − f(t))dt
T
0
/∫ OverallSLA dt, else
T
0
 
(4.8) 
The first two conditions mean that the flexible SLA is violated. In these situations, user’s 
satisfaction degree is equal to -1. While the last condition means that the flexible SLA (both 
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𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑆𝐿𝐴 and 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑆𝐿𝐴) is satisfied; in this situation, user’s satisfaction degree could be 
calculated and normalized into range [0, 1], through a ratio between two covered areas [121]. 
 Yang et al. (2013) [122] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Hybrid Trust Mechanism [122] which is a trust 
model in which primary includes two trust modules named the initial trust module and trust-aided 
evaluation module. After an initial and a basic trust is established in initial trust module, the trust-
aided evaluation module will be used to verify the service provider dependable further. The initial 
trust technologies are SLA, the third-party audits, self-assessment mechanisms etc. Cloud users 
are responsible for monitoring SLA violations and applying for compensation from the service 
providers. Also, a professional and impartial third party is needed to provide these services. CSPs 
employ different cloud audit standards to assure cloud users about their offered services and 
platforms. The audit standards, however, are not sufficient to alleviate the cloud users' security 
concerns and most of the CSPs are not willing to share the audit reports, which also lead to a lack 
of transparency. A cloud user can study information about the service which is revealed by a 
service provider by requiring the self-assessment questionnaires. Accreditation is somewhat 
similar to audit, which can conduct independent assessment of the cloud services performance. 
Figure shows the trust service architecture [122].  
As we can see in the figure 4.34 it has two primary trust modules between cloud users and 
service providers, namely, initial trust module, and trust-aided evaluation module. The initial trust 
module includes SLAs, cloud Audits, self-assessment questionnaire, 677 accreditation, and so on, 
which just provides an initial and a basic trust in selecting service providers and devoted by some 
public research organizations like Cloud Security Alliance. After establishing the initial and basic 
trust, the trust-aided evaluation module is used to verify and reevaluate the trust. The trust-aided 
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evaluation module encompasses three phases: trust formulation, trust evolution, and service 
monitor. The trust formulation unit is employed to compute the overall trust values based on the 
direct trust values and the reputation values by using Bayesian statistic, evidence theory or other 
approaches. The final trust values can be updated while taking into account the confidence factor 
and the time decay factor in the trust evolution phase. The confidence factor is defined as the 
number of transactions between cloud users and CSPs [122]. 
 
Figure 4.34. Trust service architecture for cloud computing [122] 
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 Habib et al. (2014) [123] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Multi-Faceted trust model which is a SLA based 
Trust Management (TM) system architecture for a cloud computing marketplace. Figure 4.39 
shows the system architecture of this model. As we can see in the figure 4.39 CSPs register through 
the Registration Manager (RM) to be able to act as sellers in a cloud marketplace. They have to 
provide system/service specifications related to the service delivery models (e.g., SaaS, PaaS, 
IaaS) they offer and fill in the CAI questionnaire as a part of cloud marketplace policy. The RM 
forwards the answers of the questionnaire and system/service description to the CAIQ engine and 
TI (Trust Information) respectively for further processing. The CAIQ engine CSPs to fill in the 
CAI questionnaire by providing an intuitive graphical interface through the RM [123].  
 
Figure 4.35. Multi-faceted architecture Overview [123] 
 
The questionnaire helps CSPs to represent their competencies to the potential users with 
respect to different attributes. The questions are designed to be answered in ’yes’ or ’no’. All the 
answers are stored in the TI for further processing. The TMg allows cloud users to specify their 
requirements and opinions when accessing the trust score of CSPs. It provides a web-based front 
end to the users for specifying their requirements. Based on the requirements, the TMg provides 
the trust score of CSPs by using the Trust Semantic Engine (TSE) and Trust Computation Engine 
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(TCE). By default, users receive the trust value of a CSP based on the self-assessment using the 
CAIQ and assessment of cloud-based services/systems. Otherwise, users can specify their own 
preferences (e.g., security and performance are preferred over CC support), according to their 
business policy and requirements, to get a customized trust value of the CSPs. The TSE models 
which configuration of PLTs are considered to be the expected (trustworthy) behavior of a CSP in 
terms of a specific attribute. A default configuration of PLTs should be based on the CAIQ answers 
stored in the repository (TI). The TSE should be able to convert every trust relevant information 
into PLTs. The TCE consist of operations related to the operators (AND, OR, NOT, FUSION, 
CONSENSUS, DISCOUNT ING), used in PLTs to compute the corresponding trust values. The 
TCE is tightly coupled with the TSE to evaluate the PLTs and compute corresponding trust values. 
The trust values are archived in the TI repository after computation. The TUE allows to collect 
opinions from various sources and roots about the trustworthiness of CSPs [123]. 
 Kanwal et al. (2014) [124] 
The authors proposed a trust evaluation model for Cloud federation to evaluate and 
establish bi-directional trust between home and foreign CSPs. The evaluation of trust is based on 
feedback (collected from registered CCs) and SLAs of CSPs. The trust evaluation model acts as a 
trusted third party that evaluates the trust of CSPs and provides the required trust credentials on 
receiving the trust requests from CSPs participating in federation. Figure shows the architecture of 
the model. The Registration Manager (RM) is responsible for registration of CSPs and the CCs 
that are consuming different services of these CSPs. During registration, the RM also collects 
standard SLAs of CSP which are later used by the SLA Manager for evaluation of trust score. 
Furthermore, each registered CSP submits its metadata to the RM. SLA Management (SM) is 
responsible to extract the QoP attributes from the provided SLA of CSP and evaluate the trust 
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score from these parameters. It includes three main sub modules namely; SLA Repository (SR) 
which manages the storage of SLAs collected from the registered CSPs at the time of registration, 
Parameter Extraction (PE) which retrieves the SLA from the SR and extracts the essential QoP 
attributes offered by the particular CSP and SLA based Trust Evaluation (STE) which receives 
The extracted parameters from PE module [124].  
 
Figure 4.36. Overall workflow of Trust Evaluation Model [124] 
 
The Feedback Management (FM) module receives the information from registration 
module and evaluates the trust of CSP based on the received feedback. It has three major sub-
modules namely the Feedback Repository (FR) which collects the submitted feedback from 
Feedback Collection Manager and manages the storage of the feedback at backend database, 
Feedback based Trust Evaluation (FTE) which retrieves the feedback from FR and evaluates the 
trust score based on this feedback and Feedback Collection (FC) which is responsible for collecting 
feedback regarding security and privacy features supported by CSPs. The Trust Management 
module is responsible for receiving the trust requests from registered CSPs participating in 
federation with other CSPs; furthermore it verifies the trust requests and generates the trust 
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responses accordingly. In order to generate the trust response, the TM collects the evaluated trust 
scores and calculate total aggregate trust as follow [124]:  
Tfinal =
TSLA + Tfeedback
2
 
(4.9) 
 Marudhadevi et al. (2015) [125] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Trust mining model (TMM) [125] to identify 
trusted cloud services while negotiating an SLA. The challenge for the user is to monitor the 
services provided from the CSP and check if they meet the conditions mentioned in the agreement. 
To perform this, the user needs further information such as prior data or knowledge about what is 
happening on the CSP side, which can help him to better realize the effective QoS. The trust model 
evaluates the trust degree on the prior data obtained about the service at the time of the SLA. Then, 
this information is divided into multiple common attributes like the number of service denials, 
average response time, task success ratio and number of complaints registered by the users. 
Usually, attributes used to formulate any trust model can be either objective or subjective, while 
this work uses both types of values. In this way, advantages introduced with this approach are both 
for CSPs and end users. From one side, the CSP can monitor the performance and improve its 
services to establish better trust relations with the users. And from the other side, the CC can 
perceive as secure working with the CSP [125]. 
 Pawar et al. (2012) [126] 
The authors proposed a trust model named SLA monitoring compliance which is an 
uncertainty model, which calculates trust values based on different parameters, namely SLA 
monitoring compliance, service provider ratings, and service provider behavior. More in detail, 
the SLA monitoring defines the opinion about a CSP from the established SLAs about its services. 
Each of them are provided with a single SLA that includes several common indicators, such as 
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CPU, memory, disk space usage, number of virtual machines. For each indicator of an SLA, a 
monitor evaluating the compliance/noncompliance of the indicator is provided. Then, CSP ratings 
are determined with the computation of all ratings, based on consensus and conjunction ratings. 
To calculate trust values, the model take into account features like belief, disbelief, uncertainty, 
and base rate [126].  
4.3.1. Analyzing SLA Based Trust 
Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 represent the analysis of SLA based trust models based on the 
selected assessment criteria defined in chapter 3. The assessment criteria and the cloud computing 
challenges that each trust feature address are indicated in the tables. In the tables  means the trust 
model does not evaluate the specified assessment criteria and  means that it does. Also, there are 
some assessment criteria that if the trust model evaluates them instead of having  as an indicator, 
it is mentioned how it support that criteria such as attack resistance, trust evaluation, trust scope 
and trust aggregation.  
Based on table 4.7, none of the selected SLA based trust models evaluates encryption that 
address lack of confidentiality challenge. In order to find the trust models that address lack of 
reliability, Habib (2014) is the only model that evaluates attack resistance assessment criteria under 
this category and Chakraborty (2012) is the only trust model that evaluates punishment of 
agreement violation.  
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Table 4.7. Evaluating SLA Based Trust Models – Part A 
Challenges Lack of Confidentiality Lack of Reliability 
 Encryption Attack resistance Punishment of Agreement Violation 
Alhamad (2010)    
SLA Assurance    
Chakraborty 
(2012) 
 
  
Jules (2014)    
FL-FL    
Yang (2013) 
 
  
Habib (2014)  Sybil  
Kanwal (2014)    
TMM    
SLA Monitoring 
Compliance 
 
  
Table 4.8 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of identity management 
and lack of privacy assessment criteria. Considering lack of identity management, Yang (2013) 
and Kanwal (2014) are the two trust models that both evaluate identity management and trust 
bootstrapping. In addition, FL-FL and SLA Monitoring Compliance trust models are the SLA 
based trust models that just evaluate trust bootstrapping trust feature. Therefore, based on the CC 
concern in case of lack of identity management they can choose the trust model that does their 
required evaluation. Table 4.8 also analyzes selected reputation based trust models based on three 
assessment criteria that address lack of privacy. None of the studied SLA based trust models 
evaluate transferability and heterogeneity support. In addition, among all of the studied SLA based 
trust models, just Yang (2013) and Kanwal (2014) evaluate security enabled trust. 
 
94 
 
Table 4.8. Evaluating SLA Based Trust Models – Part B 
Challenges Lack of Identity Management Lack of Privacy 
 Identity Management Trust Bootstrapping Transferability Heterogeneity Security Enabled Trust 
Alhamad (2010)   
 
  
SLA Assurance   
 
  
Chakraborty 
(2012) 
  
 
  
Jules (2014)   
 
  
FL-FL   
 
  
Yang (2013)   
 
  
Habib (2014)   
 
  
Kanwal (2014)   
 
  
TMM   
 
  
SLA Monitoring 
Compliance 
  
 
  
Table 4.9 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of reputation, lack of SLA 
Support and lack of transparency. Considering lack of reputation, SLA Assurance, Jules (2014), 
Kanwal (2014), TMM, and SLA Monitoring Compliance evaluate trust based on outside in 
approach. While, Chakraborty (2012), SLA Based Trust and Yang (2013), Habib (2014) and SLA 
Monitoring Compliance are evaluating trust based on inside out approach and FL-FL is evaluating 
trust based on black box approach. In addition, Alhamad (2010), SLA Assurance, Jules (2014), 
and TMM are evaluating trust based on global trust and FL-FL and Kanwal (2014) trust models 
are evaluating local trust.  
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Table 4.9. Evaluating SLA Based Trust Models – Part C 
Challenges Lack of Reputation 
Lack of SLA 
Support 
Lack Of 
Transparency 
 
 
Trust 
evaluation 
Trust 
scope 
Reputation 
Enabled Trust 
Trust 
Aggregation 
Trust 
Evidence 
SLA 
Verification 
Transparency 
Alhamad 
(2010) 
Inside out 
Global  
Decentralize Indirect   
SLA 
Assurance 
Outside in 
Global 
 Centralize Indirect   
Chakraborty 
(2012) 
Inside in 
- - 
- Direct   
Jules (2014) Outside in 
Global  
Centralize Direct   
FL-FL Black box 
Local  
Decentralize Direct   
Yang 
(2013) 
Inside out 
- - 
- Indirect   
Habib 
(2014) 
Inside out 
- - 
- Indirect   
Kanwal 
(2014) 
Outside-in 
Local  
Centralize Indirect   
TMM Outside-in 
Global  
Centralize Direct   
SLA 
Monitoring 
Compliance 
Inside-in 
- - 
- Direct   
   Furthermore, Alhamad (2010), SLA Assurance, Jules (2014), TMM, FL-FL and Kanwal 
(2014) are evaluate reputation enabled trust. SLA Based Trust and FL-FL can evaluate decentralize 
trust models while SLA Assurance, Jules (2014), Kanwal (2014) and TMM evaluate centralize 
trust model. Finally, Chakraborty (2012), Jules (2014), FL-FL, TMM and SLA Monitoring 
Compliance are evaluating direct trust evidence, while others evaluating indirect trust. By 
considering lack of SLA support, just Habib (2014), TMM and SLA Monitoring Compliance have 
96 
 
SLA verification mechanism. In addition, regarding lack of transparency, none of the studied trust 
models evaluate transparency in trust management systems. 
4.4. Domain Based Trust Models 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, domain based trust model divides the cloud into a number of 
autonomous domains and provides trust evaluation both for within-domain and inter-domain 
interactions. In this section in order to evaluate domain based trust models some of the recent trust 
models have been studied and analyzed based on the assessment criteria discussed in chapter 3.  
 Wu et al. (2012) [127] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Fuzzy Reputation-Based Trust Model (FRTM) 
[127] which is based on fuzzy logic inferences. The main idea of this trust model is to use fuzzy 
logic inferences to handle uncertainty, fuzziness, and incomplete information in cloud trust reports. 
This model helps CCs determine the level of trust that is to be placed on any particular CSP [127].  
The steps of the fuzzy reputation-based trust model are presented in figure 4.37. Such steps 
are as follows [127]: 
 
Figure 4.37. The steps of the fuzzy reputation-based trust model [127] 
 
1) The trust model FRTM selects the CSP to have an interaction with.  
2) Such providers has a perceived certain goodness (‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’).  
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3) According to the required cloud service attributes and the provider goodness, the CSP 
provides a service to the CC.  
4) The CC satisfaction is assessed based on the provided service in the previous step. 
5) Finally, the punishment level is determined by the CC satisfaction with the received 
service, together with and other CC satisfactions. 
Xu Wu has calculated the global reputation using the following formula [127]: 
𝑅𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 ∑ [
𝜗𝐶𝑗
∑ 𝜗𝐶𝑗𝐶𝑗∈𝑄
𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑗]
𝐶𝑗∈𝑄
+ 𝛽
𝑓(𝑝𝑖)
𝑙(𝑄)
= 𝛼
∑ 𝜗𝐶𝑗𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑗𝐶𝑗∈𝑄
∑ 𝜗𝐶𝑗𝐶𝑗∈𝑄
+ 𝛽
𝑓(𝑝𝑖)
𝑙(𝑄)
 
(4.10) 
where Q is the set of the CCs with whom the CSP 𝑝𝑖 has conducted interactions, 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑗  is 
the local trust score of the CSP 𝑝𝑖 rated by 𝑐𝑖 , and 𝜗𝐶𝑗  is the aggregation weight of 𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑗. 
𝑓(𝑝𝑖) denotes a punishment function of a ratio of the service satisfaction the CSP 𝑝𝑖 is received 
during the recent time window. 𝑙(𝑄) denotes the total numbers of interactions performed by the 
CSP  𝑝𝑖 with all other CCs. 𝛼 and 𝛽 denote the normalized weight factors in order to give the CSP 
 𝑝𝑖 a punishment level. 
In this model five frequently used fuzzy inference rules are applied which are: 1) If the 
interaction data size is very high and the interaction time is new, then the aggregation weight is 
very large. 2) If the interaction data size is very low or the interaction time is very old, then the 
aggregation weight is small. 3) If a CSP’s reputation is good and the interaction data size is high, 
then the aggregation weight is very large. 4) If a CSP’s reputation is good and the interaction data 
size is low, then the aggregation weight is medium. 5) If a CSP’s is bad, then the aggregation 
weight is very small [127]. 
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 Yang et al. (2010) [128]  
The authors proposed a collaborative trust model of firewall-through based on Cloud 
Computing combining the strength of domain-based trust model and the feature of the firewall. 
The model has many advantages: Firstly, there are different security policies for different domains. 
Secondly, the model considers the transaction context, the historical data of entity influences and 
the measurement of trust value dynamically. Thirdly, the trust model is compatible with the 
firewall and does not break the firewall’s local control policies.  
 
Figure 4.38. The structure of firewall-through based on cloud computing [128] 
 
Figure 4.38 shows the structure of this model. This model divides the Cloud into different 
autonomous domains according to the physical address. The trust value of the nodes which have 
traded with other nodes within the domain are kept in Trust Table (TT). Each domain sets up a 
domain agent maintaining three tables; Domain inside trust table (DITT) stores trust values of all 
the nodes inside the domain, calculated by the average weight of recommended trust value of nodes 
which already had direct trading with this node; Domain outside trust table (DOTT) stores the 
value of the overall confidence for this domain to adjacent domains whose value is also average 
of nodes weight of trust evaluation. The risk-value table (RVT) is the definition of risk. When a 
user requests for resources, the domain agent broadcasts a message to the neighborhood agent in 
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inter-domain trust table, after successfully receive the message, neighborhood agents interact with 
the firewall and drive firewall by the introduction of agent sending the XML format message, then 
new members IP open up. If it is the first trading, service providers require the requester's digital 
signature. The approach of user releasing resources is similar with the process of requesting for 
resources. Set the time decay function to update the impact on trust value while taking into account 
the number of successful transactions [128]. 
 Varadharajan et al. (2012) [129] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Trust Enhanced Security for Cloud 
Environments (TREASURE) [129] which is a property based attestation techniques for the cloud. 
Our model extends the node controller with the functionality of the CA to certify the behavior of 
the tenant virtual machines. Since the Node Controller is aware of the dynamic changes to the 
tenant virtual machine, it can ensure that the certified properties are satisfied by the tenant virtual 
machines. In this model authorization decisions in trusted platforms can be made not only by taking 
into account the identities and privileges of users and applications but also the state of the platform 
in terms of what types of applications and software components are running on that platform [129].  
Figure 4.39 shows a generic cloud architecture. In TREASURE model the Certification 
Authority (CA) is used to certify some of the properties related to the communication between the 
tenant virtual machine (Attestation Provider (AP)) and the tenant customer (Attestation Requestor 
(AR)). In this case, the CA only certifies the basic security properties which are the assurance on 
the traffic originating from the AP and validation of the AP transactions. Spoofing is one of the 
fundamental challenges which makes it extremely difficult to deal with the attacks in the current 
environment. With the current TPM attestation techniques, there is no guarantee that the AP 
platform will not flood the AR with malicious traffic. The AR which needs to perform transaction 
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makes an attestation request to the tenant virtual machine (AP). The trusted platform provides an 
attestation report with the stored values that are measured during boot time. Now the AR can use 
the values in the report to validate the state of tenant virtual machine. In this model, the CA only 
certifies the basic security properties for communication between the AP and AR. The security 
properties are: assurance on the source address of the traffic originating from tenant virtual 
machine (AP) and validation on the traffic originating from tenant virtual machine (AP). If the 
traffic from the tenant server was found to be malicious then the AR can report the malicious traffic 
to the CA. Now CA can validate the AR report and take measures to deal with the possible 
compromise of the tenant virtual machine. After a successful transaction, the CA generates a 
signed report to the AP and AR with the transaction details [129]. 
 
Figure 4.39. TREASURE cloud architecture [129] 
 
 Li et al. (2010) [130] 
The authors proposed a domain-based trust model to ensure the security and 
interoperability of cloud and cross-clouds environment and a security framework with an 
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independent trust management module on top of traditional security modules. They also put 
forward some trust based security strategies for the safety of both CCs and providers based on this 
security model. This model is domain-based and it differentiates two kinds of cloud roles: CC and 
CSP. Resources that belong to the same providers will attend the same trust domain. In each trust 
domain, it sets a trust agent to manage trust.  
The propose security framework contains five layers. From bottom to up are physical 
security layer, system security layer, security abstract layer, trust management layer and security 
application layer. Physical security layer includes the electronics and physical measures to ensure 
the security of data storage or data transmission. System security layer provides security measures 
such as firewall, VPN (Virtual Private Network), SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), SSH (Secure Shell), 
Kerberos, Integrity Check, etc. Security abstract layer provides uniform interface for different 
kinds of security technologies. Trust management layer provides trust strategies to aid security 
judgements in cloud and heterogeneous cross-clouds environments and security application layer 
provides variety kinds of safe and trustable cloud applications [130].  
Figure 4.40 shows the working mechanism in the new framework and the relationship 
between traditional security module and the trust management module. The basic process of 
making security decision in the proposed security model is [130]:  
1) Security management layer passes the set of related cloud nodes to trust management 
layer,  
2) Trust management layer evaluates the corresponding nodes’ trust level and returns a 
credible subset according to its' local trust policies,  
3) Security management layer made security judgement. 
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The basic procedure of trust-based authorization mechanism for CSPs contains the 
following six steps [130]. 
 Step 1: B’s security management module transfers the identity of user A and list A to 
trust management module when job request of T is received from A. 
 Step 2: B’s trust management module judges whether user A is trust enough. If A is 
creditable, it goes to step 3 else rejects to trade with A directly.  
 Step 3: B’s trust management module searches for trust thresholds of other participants 
in list A and generates list T hold based on its local trust policy and the current security 
level.  
 Step 4: B’s trust management module computes each cooperator’s trust value and 
evaluates if it is bigger than the corresponding threshold. It deletes creditable nodes 
from list A and adds them to list T.  
 Step 5: B’s trust management module returns list T to security management module.  
 Step 6: B’s security management module compares list T with list A. If the two are 
equal, B agrees to trade with A else it rejects. 
 
Figure 4.40. Working mechanism of the proposed security framework and relationship between 
security management module and trust management module [130] 
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 Li et al. (2009) [131] 
The authors proposed a trust model which divides one CSP’s resource nodes into the same 
domain and sets trust agent. It distinguishes two different roles CC and cloud server and designs 
different strategies for them. In our model, trust recommendation is treated as one type of cloud 
services just like computation or storage. The model achieves both identity authentication and 
behavior authentication. Figure 4.41 shows the basic realization framework of this model. 
 
Figure 4.41. Realization framework of interoperability enhancing trust model [131] 
 
In this model Safe transactions in cross-clouds environment are ensured by trust 
mechanism of which the key is trust decision. When CCs want to use cloud services, they have to 
make trust decision. Also when service providers want to cooperate, they have to make trust 
decision. Explicit trust decision needs a threshold. Unless trust value is bigger than or trust degree 
is higher than the threshold, entities will not continue their transaction. In our model, threshold is 
customizable and cloud entity or trust domain can independently set its threshold according to its 
current level of security. The general process of trust decision in our model is as follows: first of 
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all, to search corresponding value of special trading partner in local trust table (for CC is customer 
trust table and for provider is domain trust table). If there exists the value and it exceeds the 
threshold, entity will agree to continue the transaction else transaction will be suspended. If no 
corresponding record is found, entity will broadcast trust request within familiar domains. And 
original trust for counterparty will be calculated using the received recommendation trust and 
corresponding recommendation factor [131]. 
Two factors cause the update of trust: one is time and the other is re-evaluation of trust 
after each transaction. Time influence is continuous while transactions’ are leaping. So the model 
adopts different strategies to evaluate them. It tends to use appropriate attenuation function to 
measure time influence. And in contrast it counts much on the evaluation of last time transaction 
rather than history cooperation data. Below is the different update policy for different cloud role 
[131]. 
4.4.1. Analyzing Domain Based Trust Models 
Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 represent the analysis of domain based trust models based on 
the selected assessment criteria defined in chapter 3. The assessment criteria and the cloud 
computing challenges that each trust feature address are indicated in the tables.  In the tables  
means the trust model does not evaluate the specified assessment criteria and  means that it does. 
Also, there are some assessment criteria that if the trust model evaluates them instead of having  
as an indicator, it is mentioned how it support that criteria such as attack resistance, trust 
evaluation, trust scope and trust aggregation. 
Based on table 4.10, none of the selected domain based trust models evaluates encryption 
that address lack of confidentiality challenge. In order to find the trust models that address lack of 
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reliability, TREASURE is the only model that evaluates attack resistance assessment criteria under 
this category and FRTM is the only trust model that evaluates punishment of agreement violation. 
Table 4.10. Evaluating Domain Based Trust Models – Part A 
Challenges Lack of Confidentiality  Lack of Reliability 
 Encryption Attack resistance Punishment of Agreement Violence 
FRTM    
Yang (2010)    
TREASURE  Spoofing / malicious traffic  
Li (2010)    
Li (2010)    
Table 4.11 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of identity management 
and lack of privacy assessment criteria. Considering lack of identity management, TREASURE 
and Li (2010) are the two trust models that evaluate identity management.  
Table 4.11. Evaluating Domain Based Trust Models – Part B 
Challenges Lack of Identity Management Lack of Privacy 
 Identity Management Trust Bootstrapping Transferability Heterogeneity Security Enabled Trust 
FRTM      
Yang (2010)      
TREASURE      
Li (2010)      
Li (2010)   
  
 
In addition, FRTM evaluate trust bootstrapping trust feature. Therefore, based on the CC 
concern in case of lack of identity management they can choose the trust model that does their 
required evaluation. Table 4.11 also analyzes selected domain based trust models based on three 
assessment criteria that address lack of privacy. FRTM and [128] evaluate transferability. All of 
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the studied domain based trust models evaluate heterogeneity support. In addition, among all of 
the studied domain based trust models, just Yang (2010), TREASURE and Li (2010) evaluate 
security enabled trust.   
Table 4.12 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of reputation, lack of 
SLA Support and lack of transparency. Considering lack of reputation, Firewall Through based 
Trust Model and Li (2009) evaluate trust based on outside in approach. While, FRTM is evaluating 
trust based on black box approach and TREASURE and Li (2010) evaluate trust based on inside 
out approach. In addition, FRTM and Li (2009) are evaluating trust based on global trust. 
Furthermore, FRTM, and Li (2009) are evaluate reputation enabled trust. Firewall through based 
trust model and Li (2009) can evaluate decentralize trust models while FRTM evaluate centralize 
trust model. Finally, FRTM, TREASURE, Trust Management Model are evaluating direct trust 
evidence, however, firewall through trust model is evaluating indirect trust evidence while Li 
(2009) evaluate both direct and indirect trust. By considering lack of SLA support, just Li (2009), 
has SLA verification mechanism. In addition, regarding lack of transparency, none of the studied 
trust models evaluate transparency in trust management systems.    
Table 4.12. Evaluating Domain Based Trust Models – Part C 
Challenges Lack of Reputation 
Lack of 
SLA 
Support 
Lack Of 
Transparency 
 
Trust 
evaluation 
Trust Scope 
Reputation 
Enabled Trust 
Trust 
Aggregation 
Trust 
Evidence 
SLA 
Verification 
Transparency 
FRTM Black Box Global  Centralize Direct   
Yang (2010) Inside out -  - Indirect   
TREASURE Inside-out -  - Direct   
Li (2010) Inside-out -  - Direct   
Li (2010) Outside in 
Global  
Decentralize Direct/Indirect   
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4.5. Platform Based Trust 
As discussed in section 2.2.2, platform based trust models consists of policies that ensure 
applications are executing on platforms that meet a specified trust assurance level and evaluate the 
confidence of CCs on using cloud services lunch on a specific platform. In this section in order to 
evaluate platform based trust models some of the recent trust models have been studied and 
analyzed based on the assessment criteria discussed in chapter 3.  
 Li et al. (2013) [132]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Cloud-Trust [132] which is an adaptive trust 
model for efficiently evaluating the competence of a cloud service based on its multiple trust 
attributes. In Cloud-Trust, two kinds of adaptive modelling tools (rough set and Induced Ordered 
Weighted Averaging (IOWA) operator) are organically integrated and successfully applied to trust 
data mining and knowledge discovery. This model advocates an objective, attribute-based scheme 
in which users record their experiences with service providers rather than their subjective ratings. 
A user’s experience with a service provider captures the difference between the requested service 
and the delivered service in terms of service specific attribute values. This can eliminate the issues 
of collaborative cheating or fraudulent practices prevalent in traditional reputation-based trust 
models. Also, this model uses rough set theory to adaptively conduct knowledge discovery of 
multiple trust attribute values (evidences). This feature of the model surpasses the limitations of 
traditional weighting methods for multiple attributes, in which weights are assigned subjectively 
[132]. The trust value in this model is calculated as follow [132]: 
𝑇𝑡(𝑁𝑖) = 𝑟𝑡 × {𝜛1, 𝜛2, … ,𝜛𝑘 , … ,𝜛𝑚}
𝑇 (4.11) 
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where 𝑁𝑖 is ith service in the cloud. 𝜛𝑘 is the weight which assigned to this normalized 
evidence and 𝜛𝑘  ∈ [0, 1], ∑ 𝜛𝑘 = 1
𝑚
𝑘=1 . 𝑟𝑡 = (𝑟𝑡1, 𝑟𝑡2, … , 𝑟𝑡𝑘, … , 𝑟𝑡𝑚) is a sample of trust degree 
measurement, and it is an m-dimensional vector and 𝑟𝑡𝑘 is [132]: 
𝑟𝑡𝑘 = 1 −
𝑥𝑡𝑘 −min (𝑥𝑡𝑘)
max(𝑥𝑡𝑘) − min (𝑥𝑡𝑘)
 
(4.12) 
where 𝑥𝑡𝑘 is the number of illegal connections, the number of scanning of important ports, 
the number of denial services and the average response time. 
 Raju et al. (2014) [133]  
The authors proposed a trust model named Build Trust on Cloud (BTC) [133] which is a 
model to build trust on the CSP from the consumer’s perspective. This model is built by 
considering two issues i.e. security and lack of transparency. In this model whenever a cloud 
Virtual Machine (VM) is configured, a sensor is assigned and dedicated to it. Each sensor identifies 
and collects the events that are commonly suspicious. To by using anomaly based or any hybrid 
based detection technique. Each sensor identifies sets of patterns that are deviating from the normal 
behavior and reports to the Master Module (MM) at the VMM level as shown in Figure 4.42.  
 
Figure 4.42. Sensor based malware detection [133] 
 
Then based on the type of the abnormal events reported, MM can invoke and spawn the 
appropriate processes and get them applied on the compromised VM. The incident can be 
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confirmed after correlating all the spawned process results. After its conformance, it is more 
suggestible to do live migration or a snapshot of the VM to increase the reliability of the evidence 
collection [133]. 
In order to solve lack of transparency when an instance requested for some resource the 
scheduling algorithm checks for the resource that has not allotted to any other VM recently. If that 
type of resource is not available then it checks for the resource previously used by the instance 
holding less sensitive data by starting checking from the same zone to nearby zones. For 
calculating sensitivity, it is used the Natural Language Processing to perform filtering at various 
levels. The outputs have to be properly linked by applying item response theory. If the above two 
options have not satisfied then the less trusted VM will be migrated and then allotted to the current 
requested VM (If requested VM priority is high). While performing the migration the underlying 
instructions of the function will also look at the performance issues. Once the hypervisor receives 
the request from virtual machine VMα then its trust levels will be identified. VMα has been assigned 
with a resource which was previously used by another instance (VMβ ). Then, its sensitivity of the 
operations and data used by it (instance β) are identified. Once the two parameters are identified 
(Trust and sensitivity) then whether to overwrite or not can be decided [133]. 
 Habib et al. (2011) [134] 
The authors introduced CertainTrust which provides an architecture of a multi-faceted TM 
system for cloud marketplaces providing means to efficiently differentiate between a good and a 
poor quality (beyond the performance issues) providers. The system is designed to provide a 
customized trust score of a provider based on the attributes selected by the CCs. Moreover, the 
system aims to provide trust scores of the CSPs based on trustworthy behavior of the underlying 
systems and the service providers’ answers to the CSA CAI questionnaire. Figure 4.43 shows this 
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model architecture. In this model CSPs register through the Registration Manager (RM) to be able 
to act as sellers in a cloud marketplace. The RM forwards the answers of the questionnaire and 
system/service description to the CAIQ engine and Trust Information (TI) respectively for further 
processing [134].  
 
Figure 4.43. Trust model architecture [134] 
 
The CAIQ engine allows CSPs to fill in the CAI questionnaire by providing an intuitive 
graphical interface through the RM. The TMg allows cloud users to specify their requirements and 
opinions when accessing the trust score of CSPs. It provides a web-based front end to the users for 
specifying their requirements. The TSE models are considered to be the expected (trustworthy) 
behavior of a CSP in terms of a specific attribute. The TCE consist of operations related to the 
operators (AND, OR, NOT, FUSION, CONSENSUS, DISCOUNT ING), used in PLTs to 
compute the corresponding trust values. The Trust Update Engine (TUE) allows to collect opinions 
from various sources and roots about the trustworthiness of CSPs [134].  
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 Zhexuan et al. (2010) [135] 
The authors have taken a look at the security issues SaaS might create due to the 
unrestricted access on user data given to the remotely installed software. The authors have 
presented a mechanism to separate software from data so that it is possible to create a trusted 
binding between them. The mechanism introduced involves four parties namely the resource 
provider, software provider, data provider and the coordinator. The resource provider hosts both 
data and software and provides the platform to execute the software on data. The software provider 
and data provider are the owners of the software and data respectively. The coordinator brings the 
other parties together while providing the ancillary services such as searching for resources and 
providing an interface to execute the application on the data [135].  
The operation of the model is as follows: Software provider and data provider upload their 
resources to the resource provider. These resources will be encrypted before stored and the key 
will be stored in the accountability vault module of the system. A data provider searches for and 
finds the required software through a coordinator and then runs the software on the data uploaded 
to the resource provider‘s site. Once the execution has started an execution reference ID is 
generated and given to the data provider. When the execution of the software is over, the results 
are produced only on the data provider‘s interface which can be viewed, printed or downloaded. 
Data provider will then pay for the service that will be split between the software provider and 
resource provider. An operation log has been created and posted to the software provider without 
disclosing the data provider‘s identity or the content on which software was run. This helps the 
software provider know that his software has been used and the duration of use [135].  
Even though the authors claim that this model separates the software and data, there is no 
assurance that the software cannot make a copy while the data is being processed as only the 
112 
 
algorithm or description of the software is provided to the data owner. Without the source code, 
there is no assurance that the code will not contain any malicious code hidden inside. Also, since 
the software runs on data owner‘s rights and privileges, the software would have complete control 
over data. This is a security threat and the audit trail even if it is available, will not detect any 
security breaches [135].  
The authors do not address the question of trust on the proposed platform as this would be 
another application or service hosted on the cloud. Both application providers and data providers 
need some kind of better assurance as now they are entrusting their data and software to a third 
party software.  
 Sato et al. (2010) [136] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Security Aware Cloud which is a trust model 
of cloud security in terms of social security [136]. The authors have identified and named the 
specific security issue as social insecurity problem and tried to handle it using a three pronged 
approach. They have subdivided the social insecurity problem in to three sub areas, namely; 
multiple stakeholder problem, open space security problem and mission critical data handling 
problem.  
The multiple stakeholder problem addresses the security issues created due to the multiple 
parties interacting in the cloud system. As per the authors, three parties can be clearly identified. 
They are namely, the client, the CSPs and third parties that include rivals and stakeholders in 
business. The client delegates some of the administration/operations to CSPs under a SLA. Even 
if the client would like to have the same type of policies that it would apply if the resources were 
hosted on site on the delegated resources, the provider‘s policy may differ from that of the client. 
The providers are bound only by the SLA signed between the parties. The SLA plays the role of 
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glue between the policies. Also the authors opine that once the data is put in the cloud it is open 
for access by third parties once authenticated by the CSP [136].  
The open space security problem addresses the issue of loss of control on where the data 
is stored and how they are physically managed once control of data is delegated to the CSP. They 
advise to encrypt the data before transferring, converting the data security problem to a key 
management problem as now the keys used for encryption/decryption must be handled properly.  
The mission critical data handling problem looks at the issue of delegating the control of 
mission critical data to a service provider. They advise not to delegate control of this data but to 
keep them in a private cloud in a hybrid setup, where the organization have unhindered control. 
However setting up of a private cloud may not be an option to small and medium sized 
organizations due to the high costs involved. Hence enhancement of security of the public cloud 
is the only option to serve everybody.  
Authors have developed a trust model named “cloud trust model” to address the problems 
raised above. Two more trust layers have been added to the conventional trust architecture. These 
layers have been named as the internal trust layer and the contracted trust layer. The Internal trust 
layer acts as the platform to build the entire trust architecture. It is installed in the in house facilities 
and hence under the control of the local administration. ID and key management are handled under 
the internal trust. Also any data that is considered critical or needs extra security must be stored 
under this layer.  
Contracted trust has been defined as the trust enforced by an agreement. A CSP places his 
trust upon the client, based on the contract that is made up of three documents known as, Service 
Policy/Service Practice Statement (SP/SPS), Id Policy/Id Practice Statement (IdP/IdPS) and the 
contract. Level of trust required can be negotiated by parties depending on the level of security 
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needed for the data. A cloud system thus installed is called a secure cloud by the authors. Figure 
4.44 shows the security our cloud proposed by this thesis. An organization must be aware of levels 
of services. On the other hand, a CSP can believe the assertions provided by an organization in a 
given level. By evaluating the quality of services by the contract and related documents, an 
organization can make decisions whether to delegate services to CSPs depending on the qualities 
stated in the contract. Data can be placed out of the organization depending on its criticality and 
cost [136]. 
 
Figure 4.44. Security aware cloud [136] 
 
 Ko et al. (2011) [137] 
The authors proposed a trust model named TrustCloud which is a detective rather than 
preventive approaches to increasing accountability. The TrustCloud framework is independent of 
virtual or physical environments. This model makes accountability more achievable. It focuses on 
integrity and accountability of data stored in the cloud, so it requires a file-centric perspective, on 
top of the usual system-centric perspective for logging. Logs range from system-level logs to 
workflow-level audit trail transactional logs. Figure 4.45 shows the abstraction layers for the type 
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of logs needed for an accountable cloud. The lowest TrustCloud layer is the system layer. The 
system layer tracks data containers by performing file centric logging within operating systems 
(OS), file systems and cloud’s internal network. The data layer supports the data abstraction and 
facilitates data-centric logging through provenance logger and consistency logger. The workflow 
layer focuses on audit trails and audit related data found in the software services in the cloud [137].  
 
Figure 4.45. Abstraction layers of accountability in cloud computing [137] 
 
 Almorsy et al. (2011) [138] 
The authors proposed a trust model named Security Management Framework Based on 
Aligning (FISMA), which is a new cloud security management framework based on aligning the 
FISMA standard to fit with the cloud computing model, enabling CSPs and consumers to be 
security certified. This framework is based on improving collaboration between CSPs, service 
providers and service consumers in managing the security of the cloud platform and the hosted 
services [138].  
The model framework architecture consists of three main layers: a management layer, an 
enforcement layer, and a feedback layer. Management layer which is responsible for capturing 
security specifications of the CPs, SPs, and CCs. It consists of: (a) The security categorization 
service used by the hosted services’ tenants to specify security categorization of their information 
maintained by the cloud services; (b) The collaborative risk assessment service where all the cloud 
platform stakeholders participate in the risk assessment process with the knowledge they possess. 
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(c) The security controls manager service is used to register security controls, their mappings to 
the FISMA security controls’ templates, and their log files structure and locations. (d) The security 
metrics manager service is used by the cloud stakeholders to register security metrics they need to 
measure about the platform security. (e) The multi-tenant security plan (SLA) viewer service is 
used to reflect the tenant security agreement. This shows the tenant-service security categorization, 
vulnerabilities, threats, risks, the selected mitigation controls and the required metrics. (f) The 
multi-tenant security status viewer. This reflects the current values of the security metrics and their 
trends. Enforcement layer which is responsible for security planning and security controls selection 
based on the identified risks. The selected security controls are documented in the security 
management plan. The implementation service then uses this plan for maintaining security control 
configuration parameters and the mapping of such parameters to the corresponding security 
controls. Feedback layer which has two key services: the monitoring service which is responsible 
for collecting measures defined in the security metrics manager and storing it in the security 
management repository to be used by the analysis service and by the multi-tenant security status 
reporting service. The analysis service analyses the collected measures to make sure that the 
system is operating within the defined boundaries for each metric. If there is a deviation from the 
predefined limits, the analysis service will give alerts to update the current configurations [138]. 
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Figure 4.46. The collaboration-based framework architecture [138] 
 
4.5.1. Analyzing Platform Based Trust 
Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 represent the analysis of domain based trust models based on 
the selected assessment criteria defined in chapter 3. The assessment criteria and the cloud 
computing challenges that each trust feature address are indicated in the tables. In the tables  
means the trust model does not evaluate the specified assessment criteria and  means that it does. 
Also, there are some assessment criteria that if the trust model evaluates them instead of having  
as an indicator, it is mentioned how it support that criteria such as attack resistance, trust 
evaluation, trust scope and trust aggregation. 
Based on table 4.13, none of the selected platform based trust models evaluates encryption 
that address lack of confidentiality challenge. In order to find the trust models that address lack of 
reliability, Habib (2011) and FISMA are the two trust models that evaluate attack resistance 
assessment criteria under this category and in addition none of the trust models evaluates 
punishment of agreement violation.  
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Table 4.13. Evaluating Platform Based Trust Models – Part A 
Challenges Lack of Confidentiality  Lack of Reliability 
 Encryption Attack resistance Punishment of Agreement Violation 
Cloud-Trust    
BTC    
Habib (2011)  Sybil attack  
Zhexuan 
(2010) 
   
Sato (2010)    
TrustCloud    
FISMA  Malicious user  
Table 4.14 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of identity management 
and lack of privacy assessment criteria. Considering lack of identity management, BTC and 
Zhexuan, Sato and TrustCloud are the trust models that evaluate identity management.  
Table 4.14. Evaluating Platform Based Trust Models – Part B 
Challenges Lack of Identity Management Lack of Privacy 
Assessment criteria 
trust Models 
Identity 
Management 
Trust 
Bootstrapping 
Transferability Heterogeneity 
Security Enabled Trust 
Cloud-Trust      
BTC      
Habib (2011)      
Zhexuan (2010)      
Sato (2010)      
TrustCloud      
FISMA      
In addition, Li (2013) and TrustCloud evaluate trust bootstrapping trust feature. So, 
TrustCloud evaluate both identity management and trust bootstrapping assessment criteria. 
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Therefore, based on the CC concern in case of lack of identity management they can choose the 
trust model that does their required evaluation. Table 4.14 also analyzes selected platform based 
trust models based on three assessment criteria that address lack of privacy. None of the trust 
models evaluate transferability. Just BTC evaluate heterogeneity support. In addition, all of the 
studied platform based trust models evaluate security enabled trust.   
Table 4.15 analyzes trust models that evaluate trust based on lack of trust on CSPs, lack of 
SLA Support and lack of transparency. Considering lack of reputation, just Li (2013) and FISMA 
are evaluating reputation enabled trust and both of them evaluate global trust and evaluate trust 
based on outside in approach. By considering lack of SLA support, all of the studied platform 
based trust models have SLA verification mechanism except Zhexuan (2010) and TrustCloud. In 
addition, regarding lack of transparency, BTC and Li (2013) evaluate transparency in trust 
management systems.  
Table 4.15. Evaluating Platform Based Trust Models – Part C 
Challenges Lack of Trust on CSPs 
Lack of 
SLA 
Support 
Lack Of 
Transparency 
 
Trust 
evaluation 
Local/Global 
Reputation Enabled 
Trust 
Trust 
Aggregation 
Trust 
Evidence 
SLA 
Verification 
Transparency 
Cloud-Trust Outside in Global  Centralize Direct   
BTC Inside out -  - Direct   
Habib (2011) Inside out - - - Direct   
Zhexuan (2010) Inside out -  - Indirect   
Sato (2010) Inside out -  - Direct   
TrustCloud Inside out -  - Direct   
FISMA Outside in Global  Centralize Direct   
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
Cloud computing created many new opportunities for organizations across the world. For 
example, with cloud computing, cloud services are available at affordable prices. Cloud services 
help CCs to access everything from software to operating platforms without investing in hardware 
or software. Also, for storing a massive amount of data, cloud computing is very useful. CCs can 
easily add or subtract storage at any time, with no financial penalties. There are a wide variety of 
opportunities that cloud computing offers to the enterprises. Despite all these benefits, there are a 
number of concerns that make the adoption of cloud computing a little challenging and hard for 
the enterprises to find the best CSP that satisfies their concerns. In order to help the enterprises 
select the best CSP, the researchers have develop some trust models. Trust models are tools to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of the cloud services and cloud service providers. The output of a trust 
model is a score that determines how well a trust management system satisfies a set of parameters. 
Each trust model can just evaluate trust based on a specific set of criteria. The enterprises should 
find the trust model that can evaluate the criteria that address their concerns. For example, if one 
of the enterprises concerns about the confidentiality of the data stored in cloud, then it should find 
a trust model that can evaluate encryption in trust management systems. However, there are many 
trust models and it is very hard for the enterprises to choose the one that best evaluate their 
considered criteria. This thesis aims to help the enterprises find a good trust model.  Chapter two 
has studied the concerns that the enterprises have to adopt cloud computing and categorized them 
into seven challenges. In chapter three, fourteen assessment criteria have been selected to address 
each of these challenges. The enterprises need to determine the services they want to use in cloud 
and the characteristics of those services. For example, one enterprise might want a cloud service 
that is very reliable and is always available, while another enterprise is just concern about a good 
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contract with the CSP that also include some rights for the cloud consumer. Therefore, based on 
the challenges mentioned in chapter two, the former enterprise is concerned about lack of 
reliability while the latter is concerned about lack of SLA. After detecting the challenges, the 
enterprise can check the assessment criteria for each challenge in chapter three. They need to know 
which of those criteria under their selected challenges is more important for them since one trust 
model may not evaluate all of those assessment criteria. Finally, they can review the trust models 
studied in chapter four to find the best trust model that help them find the best CSP. The tables in 
chapter four help a lot in comparing and finding the best trust model. After the enterprise choose 
the right trust model, it can run that trust model on the trust management system of a specific cloud 
service, to find the goodness of the services offered. In order to make the process a little more 
clear, two scenarios is discussed below.  
The first scenario is about a company provides a drive-through grocery service in which 
customers shop online and drive to neighborhood pickup points where their purchases are loaded 
into their cars. This service is hosted different grocery stores in different part of world. It needs up 
to date knowledge of what is selling in each store so that it can order the right inventory for the 
next day. Also, it needs to have an up to date knowledge of the amount of stuff stocked at each 
store so that it does not let the customers buy the items that are not available in a specific store. In 
addition, it has a supply-chain management application used for forecasting, demand planning, 
and inventory control. Therefore, if a store in Italy decide to run a special on tomatoes that 
suddenly become available due to sunny weather, the company’s IT organization can ensure that 
their software orders the extra tomatoes and that drivers deliver them for the following day. Or, if 
a heavy snowstorm causes a store to close, the company can halt the following day’s orders so the 
store does not have to pay for unneeded merchandise.  
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This company needs a high performance storage system to help them complete its daily 
calculation of products sold, then reorder products needed for the following day by its 6:00 P.M. 
This company is willing to migrate it’s entire on-premises datacenter to the cloud. It is looking for 
a public cloud environment that provides compute, storage, networking, and other services for 
creating and hosting applications in datacenters. It needs a high performance reliable system that 
has a very low failure rate. Also, the system should be very secure since the customers will share 
their credit card information to submit their purchase. In addition, since it is a very competitive 
market, they do not want any of their competitors learn about their forecasting application. 
Therefore, considering the challenges that discussed in chapter 3, this company cares about three 
challenges. One of them is lack of reliability. The system should be reliable and attack resistance 
and no attack should be able to affect the system performance. Attack resistance is the assessment 
criteria that this company want the trust model evaluate in cloud system. The second challenge 
that this company cares about is lack of confidentiality. Both the customer information and the 
result of the supply chain management application should be store securely. Therefore, they choose 
encryption as the assessment criteria.  Third challenge is lack of privacy. The cloud system should 
have a high privacy protection against the company’s applications and data. They found that 
transferability is the assessment criteria that they would like the trust model evaluate for them. 
There are a number of CSPs that can serve this company but the managers of the company are 
very indecisive on choosing the best cloud service providers. They need to find the best trust model 
that best analyzes the cloud services based on their reliability, privacy and confidentiality concerns. 
By referring to the tables provided in chapter 4, the managers can find the trust model that help 
them to evaluate their criteria in cloud services. For instance, based on the criteria this company 
has, TREASURE trust model best satisfies their requirements. They can run this trust model on 
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trust management systems and the returned value would show the goodness of the cloud service 
and CSP.   
The next scenario is about a company that has a solution for establishing communication 
between clinicians, patients, and hospital administrators. This solution provides medical imaging, 
medical diagnostics, patient monitoring systems, performance improvement, drug discovery, and 
biopharmaceutical manufacturing technologies for the customers from all around the world. For 
instance, with this solution, doctors working in different locations can all look at the same 
diagnostic images simultaneously and collaborate with each other easily to find the best treatment 
plans for a patient. This technology reduces information silos and help doctors collaborate more 
easily and quickly on treatment plans.  
This company needs to provide a secure, centralized, real-time access to diagnostic scans 
and reports, therefore, it requires a flexible, highly scalable platform that could deliver a wide 
range of solutions and services to help imagine new ways to diagnose and treat cancer, heart 
disease, neurological diseases and other conditions earlier, more cost-effectively, and more 
efficiently. The managers of this company decided to migrate their software to the cloud. However, 
they have some concern regarding the service they get. The first one is that they are concerned 
about lack of identity management challenge in cloud computing. Since the patient data are 
confidential and just doctors should have access to them, they like the cloud service provide an 
effective identity management system. The second challenge that they are concerned about is lack 
of reliability. The system should be available at any time in order to provide a very effective and 
fast diagnostic services and it should be resistance to any attack. The third challenge in cloud 
computing that this company is concerned about is lack of confidentiality. This company expects 
that all the data that they will store in the cloud be secure and confidential. In addition, the 
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managers of this company are a little conservative so they would like to have a good contract with 
the CSP, therefore, how the SLA is written is very important for them. Based on this discussion, 
this company can choose one of the trust models that we discussed in chapter four to help them 
evaluate the CSPs. Based on the tables provided in chapter four, MTCEM is a good trust model 
that can help this company to find the best CSP. Furthermore, if the company wants to know how 
trustworthy the CSP is, they can also consider this criteria and find a trust model that satisfy this 
challenge as well.  
As it is explained here, the tables in chapter four help enterprises find a trust model that 
best evaluate the trust management systems for them. Since each trust model evaluates a limited 
number of criteria, an enterprise might need to use multiple trust models to evaluate the trust 
management systems based on all of the criteria that it considers.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, cloud computing has become a vibrant and rapidly expanding area of 
research and development. In today’s competitive environment, the service dynamism, elasticity, 
and choices offered by highly scalable cloud computing technology are too attractive for 
enterprises to ignore. These opportunities, however, don’t come without challenges. Because CSP 
controls the data, enterprises are concerned about different challenges on data confidentiality, 
privacy, integrity and availability for CCs. Today, the problem of trusting cloud computing is a 
paramount concern for most enterprises in such a way that trust is widely regarded as one of the 
top obstacles for the adoption and growth of cloud computing. In order to evaluate trust 
management systems, trust models have been developed. However, each developed trust model 
evaluates limited number of assessment criteria and it is hard for enterprises to use these trust 
models in their decision making process. In this work, a comprehensive survey has been presented 
that is, to the best of our knowledge, the first in cloud computing to focus on the evaluation of trust 
management of services and trust models usefulness, comprehensively. Six trust management 
challenges have been recognized to overcome trust issues in cloud computing in Chapter 2. 
Fourteen assessment criteria have been selected for trust based on existing trust models and then 
they have been categorized into six introduced trust challenges in Chapter 3. Fifty three trust 
models have been overviewed and compared in Chapter 4 to determine related assessment criteria 
for each of them. A generic analytical framework has been proposed in Chapter 4 that can be used 
to compare different trust models based on a set of assessment criteria. Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion on how to use the suggested analytical framework. Along with the current research 
efforts, we encourage more insight and development of innovative solutions to address the various 
open research issues that we have identified in this work. 
126 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] P. Mell and T.Grance. “The NIST definition of cloud computing,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2009. 
[2] M. Firdhous, O. Ghazali and S. Hassan. “Trust Management in Cloud Computing: A 
Critical Review,” International Journal on Advances in ICT for Emerging Regions, Vol. 
4 no. 2, pp. 24-36, 2011. 
[3] J. Staten. “Is cloud computing ready for the enterprise?” Forrester Research, 2008. 
[4] X. Li and L. Liu. "A Reputation-based Trust Model for Peer-to-Peer E-Commerce 
Communities," in IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology, 2003, pp. 
275-284. 
[5] D. Zhou. "Security Issues in Ad-hoc Networks," The Handbook of Ad-hoc Wireless 
Networks Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, Inc, 2003, pp. 569 – 582.  
[6] O. Malik. “Amazon S3 Storage Service Does Down, Still Not Up,” Internet: 
https://gigaom.com/2008/02/15/amazon-s3-service-goes-down/, Feb 15, 2008 [Jan. 24, 
2016]. 
[7] N. Gohring. “Amazon’s S3 Down for Several Hours,” Internet: 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/142549/article.html, Feb 15, 2008 [Jan. 24, 2016]. 
[8] Wikipedia. “Patrior Act,” Internet: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act. [Feb. 13, 
2016]. 
[9] M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. D. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee, D. 
Patterson, A. Rabkin, I. Stoica and M. Zaharia. “A View of Cloud Computing.” 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 50-58, April 2010. 
127 
 
[10] S. Gupta, P. Kumar and A. Abraham. “Cloud computing: Trust issues, challenges, and 
solutions,” in Managing Trust in Cyberspace, CRC press by Taylor and Francis Group, 
2013, pp. 13-39. 
[11] X. Li and J. Du. “Adaptive and Attribute based Trust model for service-level agreement 
guarantee in cloud computing.” IET Information Security, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 39-50, March 
2013.  
[12] K. M. Khan and Q. Malluhi. “Establishing Trust in Cloud Computing.” IT Professional, 
vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 20-27, Sept-Oct 2010. 
[13] P. I. Bhosle and S. A. Kasurkar. “Trust in Cloud Computing.” International Journal of 
Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology (IJARCET), vol. 2, no. 4, 
pp. 1541-1548, April 2013. 
[14] A. S. Horvat and R. Agrawal, “Trust in cloud computing,” in SoutheastCon2015, 2015, 
pp. 1-8. 
[15] A. Kanwal, R. Masood, U. E Ghazia, M. A. Shibli and A. G. Abbasi. “Assessment 
Criteria for Trust Models in Cloud Computing,” in Green Computing and 
Communications (GreenCom), 2013 IEEE and Internet of Things (iThings/CPSCom), 
IEEE International Conference on and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, 
2013, pp. 254-261. 
[16] F. Corradini, F. Angelis, F. Ippoliti and F. Marcantoni. “A Survey of Trust Management 
Models for Cloud Computing,” in 5th International Conference on Cloud Computing and 
Services Science, 2015, pp. 158-162. 
128 
 
[17] K. Rathi, D. Chhotu and M. S. Kumari. “A Survey on Trust in Cloud Computing.” 
International Journal of Engineering Technology, Management and Applied Sciences, 
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 175-181, Jan. 2015. 
[18] K. Rathi and S. Kumari. “Analyzing and Surveying Trust in Cloud Computing 
Environment.” IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 66-70, May-
Jun 2015. 
[19] J. Huang and D. M. Nicol. “Trust mechanisms for cloud computing.” Journal of Cloud 
Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications, vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 2-14, Dec 2013. 
[20] K. Hwang and D. Li. “Trusted Cloud Computing with Secure Resources and Data 
Coloring.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 14-22, Sept–Oct. 2010. 
[21] S. M. Habib, S. Ries, M. Mühlhäuser and P. Varikkattu. “Towards a trust management 
system for cloud computing marketplaces: using CAIQ as a trust information source.” in 
Security and Communication Networks, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 
2185-2200, Nov. 2014. 
[22] T. Noor, Q. Sheng, L. Yao, S. Dustdar and A. Ngu. “CloudArmor: Supporting 
Reputation-based Trust Management for Cloud Services.” IEEE transactions on parallel 
and distributed systems, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 367-380, March 2015.  
[23] R. Ko, P. Jagadpramana, M. Mowbray, S. Pearson, M. Kirchberg, Q. Liang and B. S. 
Lee. “TrustCloud: A framework for accountability and trust in cloud computing,” in 2011 
IEEE World Congress on Services (SERVICES’11), 2011, pp. 584-588. 
[24] M. Ahmed and Y. Xiang. “Trust ticket deployment: a notion of a data owner’s trust in 
cloud computing,” in 2011IEEE 10th International Conference on Trust, Security and 
Privacy in Computing and Communications, 2011, pp. 111–117. 
129 
 
[25] K. Hwang, S. Kulkarni and Y. Hu. “Cloud Security with Virtualized Defense and 
Reputation-based Trust Management,” In Proc. of IEEE 8th Int. Conf. on Dependable, 
Autonomic and Secure Computing (DASC’09), 2009, pp. 717-722.  
[26] I. Brandic, S. Dustdar, T. Anstett, D. Schumm and F. Leymann. “Compliant cloud 
computing (c3): Architecture and language support for user-driven compliance 
management in clouds,” in Proceedings of IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cloud 
Computing (CLOUD’10), 2010, pp. 244-251. 
[27] M. Alhamad, T. Dillon and E. Chang. “Sla-based trust model for cloud computing,” in 
Network-Based Information Systems (NBiS), 2010 13th IEEE International Conference, 
2010, pp. 321–324. 
[28] P. Pawar, M. Rajarajan, S. Nair, and A. Zisman. “Trust model for optimized cloud 
services,” in Trust Management VI. Springer, 2012, pp. 97–112. 
[29] S. Chakraborty and K. Roy. “An SLA-based framework for estimating trustworthiness of 
a cloud,” in Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 
2012 IEEE 11th International Conference, 2012, pp. 937–942. 
[30] D. Marudhadevi, V. N. Dhatchayani, and V. S. Sriram, “A trust evaluation model for 
cloud computing using service level agreement.” The Computer Journal, bxu129, Nov 
2014. 
[31] Z. Yang, L. Qiao, C. Liu, C. Yang, and G. Wan. "A Collaborative Trust Model of 
Firewall-through based on Cloud Computing," in 14th International Conference on 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design (CSCWD), 2010, pp. 329 - 334.  
130 
 
[32] W. Li, L. Ping and X. Pan. "Use trust management module to achieve effective security 
mechanisms in cloud environment," in International Conference on Electronics and 
Information Engineering (ICEIE), 2010, pp. 14-19.  
[33] Z. Song, J. Molina, and C. Strong. "Trusted Anonymous Execution: A Model to 
RaiseTrust in Cloud," in 9th International Conference on Grid and Cooperative 
Computing (GCC), 2010, pp. 133 - 138.  
[34] X. Y. Li, L. T. Zhou, Y. Shi, and Y. Guo. "A trusted computing environment model in 
cloudarchitecture," in Ninth International Conference on Machine Learning and 
Cybernetics (ICMLC), 2010, pp. 2843-2848.  
[35] I. Foster., Y. Zhao, I. Raicu and S. LU. “Cloud computing and grid computing 360-
degree compared,” in Proceedings of the Grid Computing Environments Workshop 
(GCE’08), 2008, pp. 1-10. 
[36] Y. Wei and M. B. Blake, “Service-oriented computing and cloud computing: challenges 
and opportunities.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 72–75, Nov-Dec 2010. 
[37] B. Sotomayor, R. S. Montero and I. Foster, “Virtual infrastructure management in private 
and hybrid clouds.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 14–22, Sept-Oct 2009. 
[38] D. Gotfrid. “Self-service, prorated supercomputing fun.” Internet: 
http://open.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/01/self-service-prorated-super-computing-fun/, 
Nov 1, 2007 [Aug. 17 2015]. 
[39] S. Pearson and Azzedine Benameur. “Privacy, Security and Trust Issues Arising from 
Cloud Computing,” 2nd IEEE International Conference on Cloud Computing Technology 
and Science, 2007, pp. 693-702. 
131 
 
[40] T. Muller. “Formal Aspects of Security and Trust”, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, pp. 
141-156. 
[41] C. P. Pfleeger and S. L. Pfleeger. Security in Computing (4th Edition). Prentice Hall 
PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2006, pp. 603-647. 
[42] S. Subashini and V. Kavitha. “A survey on security issues in service delivery models of 
cloud computing.” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 34, pp. 1-11, Jan 
2011.  
[43] S. Person. “Taking account of privacy when designing cloud computing services.” 
Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P, pp. 1-10, March 2009. 
[44] C. P. Pfleeger and S. Lawrence Pfleeger, Security in Computing (5th Edition). Prentice 
Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2015, pp. 432- 496. 
[45] O. M. willu Sangupamba, N. Prat and I. Comyn-Wattiau. “Advanced in Conceptual 
Modeling” in lecture notes in computer science, Atlanta, GA, 2014, vol. 8823, pp. 75-84. 
[46] ENISA. “An SME perspective on cloud computing-survey,” Internet: 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/, Nov. 20, 2009 [Oct. 12 2015]. 
[47] C. Torode. “Beware these risks of cloud computing, from no SLAs to vendor lock-in,” 
Internet:  http://searchcio.techtarget.com/news/1363821/Beware-these-risks-of-cloud-
computing-from-no-SLAs-to-vendor-lock-in, Aug. 6 2009 [Oct. 12 2015]. 
[48] Sun Systems. “Building Customer Trust in Cloud Computing with Transparent Security.” 
Sum Microsystems, Inc. pp. 1-26, Nov 2009. 
[49] D. H. Mcknight,N and L. Chervany. “What trust means in e-commerce customer 
relationships: an interdisciplinary conceptual typology.” International Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 35–59, Winter 2001/2002. 
132 
 
[50] J. Huang and D. Nicol. “A formal-semantics-based calculus of trust.” IEEE internet 
computing, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 38–46, June 2010. 
[51] H. Zhu, F. Bao and R. H. Deng, “Computing of trust in distributed networks,” in IACR 
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2003. 
[52] V. Kumar, B. Chejerla, S. Madria and M. Mohania. “A survey of trust and trust 
management in cloud computing,” Managing Trust in Cyberspace, CRC press, 2013, pp. 
41. 
[53] R. Lee and M. Madden. “The State of Music Downloading and File-Sharing Online.” 
Internet: http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2004/04/25/the-state-
of-music-downloading-and-filesharing-online, April 25, 2014 [May 27, 2015].  
[54] J. D. Lewis and A. J. Weigert. “Trust as a social reality.” Oxford Journals, Social forces, 
vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 967–985, Jun 1985. 
[55] A. S. Horvat and R. Agrawal. “Trust in cloud computing,” in SoutheastCon2015, 2015, 
pp. 1-8. 
[56] A. Kanwal, R. Masood, U. E Ghazia, M. A. Shibli and A. G. Abbasi. “Assessment 
Criteria for Trust Models in Cloud Computing,” in IEEE International Conference on 
Green Computing and Communications and IEEE Internet of Things and IEEE Cyber, 
Physical and Social Computing, 2013, pp. 254-261. 
[57] F. Corradini, F. D. Angelis, F. Ippoliti and F. Marcantoni. “A Survey of Trust 
Management Models for Cloud Computing,” in 5th International Conference on Cloud 
Computing and Services Science, 2015, pp. 158-162. 
133 
 
[58] K. Rathi, D. Chhotu and M. S. Kumari, “A Survey on Trust in Cloud Computing.” 
International Journal of Engineering Technology, Management and Applied Sciences, 
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 175-181, Jan 2015. 
[59] K. Rathi and S. Kumari. “Analyzing and Surveying Trust in Cloud Computing 
Environment.” IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 66-70, Jun 
2015. 
[60] J. Huang and D. M. Nicol. “Trust mechanisms for cloud computing.” Journal of Cloud 
Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications, vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 2-14, Dec 2013. 
[61] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum and J. Lacy. "Decentralized Trust Managament," in IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1996, pp. 164-173.  
[62] S. Ganeriwal, L. K. Balzano and M. B. Srivastava. "Reputation-based Framework for 
High Integrity Sensor Networks." ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 4, no. 15, 
pp. 1-38, May 2008. 
[63] J. Huang and D. M. Nicol. “Trust mechanisms for cloud computing.” Journal of Cloud 
Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications, vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 2-14, April 2013. 
[64] S. X. Wang, L. Zhang, S. Wang and X. Qiu. “A cloud-based trust model for evaluating 
quality of web services.” Journal of computer science and technology, vol. 25, pp. 1130–
1142, Nov 2013. 
[65] I. U. Haq, I. Brandic and E. Schikuta. “Sla validation in layered cloud infrastructures” in 
Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems and Services, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2010, Vol. 6296, pp. 153–164. 
[66] T. Applogic, “3tera’s Cloud Computing SLA goes live” Internet: 
http://blog.3tera.com/computing/175/, 2009 [Jun. 11 2015]. 
134 
 
[67] “Cloud computing use cases white paper,” Cloud Computing Use Cases Discussion 
Group, July 2009. 
[68] A. Kanwal, R. Masood, U. E. Ghazia, M. A. Shibli and A. G. Abbasi. “Assessment 
criteria for trust models in cloud computing,” In Green Computing and Communications 
(GreenCom), 2013 IEEE and Internet of Things (iThings/CPSCom), IEEE International 
Conference on and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing, 2013, pp. 254–261. 
[69] S. M. Habib, S. Ries and M. Muhlhauser. “Cloud computing landscape and research 
challenges regarding trust and reputation,” Ubiquitous Autonomic and Trusted 
Computing, Symposia and Workshops, 2010, pp. 410–415.  
[70] Cloud Computing Use Cases Discussion Group. “Cloud computing use cases white paper 
Version 4.0.” Cloud Computing Use Cases Discussion Group, 2010. 
[71] CSA: Cloud Security Aliance, “Domain 12: Guidance for Identity & Access Management 
V2.1”, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/csaguide-dom12-v2.10.pdf, April 2010 
[July. 2 2015]. 
[72] P. Membrey, K. C. C. Chan, N. Canh, Y. Demchenko and C. de Laat. “Trusted Virtual 
Infrastructure Bootstrapping for On Demand Services, Availability, Reliability and 
Security (ARES),” 2012 Seventh International Conference, 2012, pp. 350-357. 
[73] Y. Demchenko, C. Ngo, C. de Laat, J. Rodriguez, L. M. Contreras,  J. A. Garcia-Espin, S. 
Figuerola, G. Landi and N. Ciulli. “Intercloud Architecture Framework for 
Heterogeneous Cloud Based Infrastructure Services Provisioning On-Demand, Advanced 
Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA),” 2013 27th 
International Conference, 2013, pp. 777-784.  
135 
 
[74] Z. Malik and A. Bouguettaya. “Reputation Bootstrapping for Trust Establishment among 
Web Services.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 40-47, Jan-Feb 2009. 
[75] A. Josang, R. Ismail and C. Boyd. “A survey of trust and reputation systems for online 
service provision.” Decision Support Systems, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618–644, March 2007.  
[76] “SSH from the browser” internet: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/ssh-in-browser, 
[Feb. 2 2016]. 
[77] Y. Wang and K. Lin. “Reputation-Oriented Trustworthy Computing in E-Commerce 
Environments.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 55–59, July-Aug 2008. 
[78] R. Buyya, C.S. Yeo and S. Venugopal. “Market-oriented cloud computing: Vision, hype, 
and reality for delivering it services as computing utilities,” in High Performance 
Computing and Communications, 2008. HPCC’08. 10th IEEE International Conference, 
2008, pp. 5–13. 
[79] S. Singh and C. Morley. “Young Australians privacy, security and trust in internet 
banking,” in Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Australian Computer-
Human interaction Special interest Group, 2009, pp. 121-128. 
[80] Y. Wang and J. Vassileva. “A review on trust and reputation for web service selection,” 
Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, 2007. ICDCSW '07. 27th International 
Conference, 2007, pp 25. 
[81] S. M. Habib, S. Ries and M. Mühlhäuser. “Cloud Computing Landscape and Research 
Challenges regarding Trust and Reputation,” Ubiquitous Intelligence & Computing and 
7th International Conference on Autonomic & Trusted Computing (UIC/ATC), 2010 7th 
International Conference, 2010, pp. 410-415. 
136 
 
[82] D. Osterwalder. “Trust Through Evaluation and Certification,” Social Science Computer 
Review - The digital imperative of social sciences in the new millennium, vol. 19, no. 1, 
pp. 32-46, Mar 2001. 
[83] W. Li and L. Ping. “Trust model to enhance security and interoperability of cloud 
environment,” Cloud Computing: First International Conference, CloudCom 2009, 2009 
pp. 69-79. 
[84] M. Wanga, G. Wangb, J. Tianb, H. Zhanga and Y. Zhanga. “An Accurate and Multi-
faceted Reputation Scheme for Cloud Computing,” The 11th International Conference on 
Mobile Systems and Pervasive Computing (MobiSPC-2014) Procedia Computer Science, 
2014, vol. 34, pp. 466 – 473.  
[85] W.n Tan, Y. Sun, L. X. Li, G. Lu, and T. Wang. “A Trust Service-Oriented Scheduling 
Model for Workflow Applications in Cloud Computing.” IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL, 
vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 686-878, June 2013, 
[86] M. K. Muchahari and S. K. Sinha. “A New Trust Management Architecture for Cloud 
Computing Environment,” in IEEE Cloud Society International Symposium on Cloud 
and Services Computing, 2012, pp. 136–140. 
[87] Z. Raghebi and M. Hashemi. “A New Trust Evaluation Method based on Reliability of 
Customer Feedback for Cloud Computing,” in Information Security and Cryptology 
(ISCISC), 2013 10th International ISC Conference, 2013, pp. 1-6.  
[88] W. Fan and H. Perros. “A Reliability-based Trust Management Mechanism for Cloud 
Services,” in 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in 
Computing and Communications, 2013, pp. 1581-1586.  
137 
 
[89] T. H. Noor, Q. Z. Sheng, L. Yao, Schahram Dustdar and Anne H.H. Ngu. “CloudArmor: 
Supporting Reputation-based Trust Management for Cloud Services.” IEEE transactions 
on parallel and distributed systems, pp. 367-380, Mar 2015.  
[90] X. Li, H. Ma, W. Yao and X. Gui. “Data-driven and Feedback-Enhanced Trust 
Computing Pattern for Large-scale Multi-Cloud Collaborative Services.” IEEE 
Transactions on Services Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1, Sept. 2015.  
[91] S. Rizvi, J. Ryoo, Y. Liu, D. Zazworsky and A. Cappeta. “A Centralized Trust Model 
Approach for Cloud Computing,” in IEEE Wireless and Optical Communication 
Conference (WOCC), 2014, pp. 1-6.  
[92] A. Bradai, W. Ben-Ameur and H. Afifi. “Byzantine Resistant Reputation-based Trust 
Management,” in Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing 
(Collaboratecom), 9th International Conference Conference, 2013, pp. 269-278.  
[93] N. Agheli, B. Hosseini and A. Shojaee. “A Trust Evaluation Model for Selecting Service 
Provider in Cloud Environment,” in Computer and Knowledge Engineering (ICCKE), 
2014 4th International eConference, 2014, pp. 251-255.  
[94] X. Zhang, H. Liu, B. Li, X. Wang, H. Chen and S. Wu. “Application-Oriented Remote 
Verification Trust Model in Cloud Computing,” in 2nd IEEE International Conference on 
Cloud Computing Technology and Science, 2010, pp. 405-408.  
[95] Y. Liu, Y. Ma, H. Zhang, D. Li and G. Chen. “A Method for Trust Management in Cloud 
Computing: Data Coloring by Cloud Watermarking.” International Journal of 
Automation and Computing, vol. 3, no. 8, pp. 280-285, Aug 2011. 
138 
 
[96] D. Kong and Y. Zhai. “Trust Based Recommendation System in Service Oriented Cloud 
Computing,” in Cloud and Service Computing (CSC), 2012 international conference, 
2012, pp. 176-179. 
[97] S. Singh and D. Chand. “Trust evaluation in cloud based on friends and third party’s 
recommendations,” in Engineering and Computational Sciences (RAECS), 2014 Recent 
Advances, 2014, pp. 1–6. 
[98] S. Han, M. Hassan, C. Yoon and E. Huh. “Efficient service recommendation system for 
cloud computing market,” in 2nd international conference on interaction sciences: 
information technology, culture and human, 2009, pp. 839-845. 
[99] T. H. Noor and Q. Z. Sheng. “Trust as a service: A framework for trust management in 
cloud environments,” in Web Information System Engineering–WISE 2011, 2011, pp. 
314–321. 
[100] M. Firdhous, O. Ghazali and S. Hassan. “A trust computing mechanism for cloud 
computing,” in Kaleidoscope 2011: The Fully Networked Human Innovations for Future 
Networks and Services (K-2011), proceedings of ITU, 2011, pp. 1–7. 
[101] M. Firdhous, O. Ghazali and S. Hassan. “A trust computing mechanism for cloud 
computing with multilevel thresholding,” in Industrial and Information Systems (ICIIS), 
2011 6th IEEE International Conference, 2011, pp. 457–461. 
[102] S. Wang, J. Wei, L. Sun, Q. Sun and F. Yan. “Reputation Measurement of Cloud 
Services based on Unstable Feedback Ratings,” in IEEE International Conference on 
Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2013, pp. 474- 479. 
[103] F. J. Krautheim, D. S. Phatak and A. T. Sherman. “Introducing the Trusted Virtual 
Environment Module: A New Mechanism for Rooting Trust in Cloud Computing,” in 
139 
 
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy 
computing, 2010, p. 211-227. 
[104] L. Guoyuan, W. Danru, B. Yuyu and L. Min. “MTBAC: A Mutual Trust Based Access 
Control Model in Cloud Computing.” China Communications, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 154-
162, April 2014. 
[105] P. D. Manuel, T. Selve, M. Ibrahim and A. Barr. "Trust management system for grid and 
cloud resources," in First International Conference on Advanced Computing (ICAC 
2009), 2009, pp. 176-181.  
[106] T. Wang, B. Ye, Y. Li and Y. Yang. “Family Gene Based Cloud Trust Model,” in 
Educational and Network Technology (ICENT), 2010 International Conference, 2010, 
pp. 540-544.  
[107] Z. Wan, J. Liu and R. H. Deng. “HASBE: A Hierarchical Attribute-Based Solution for 
Flexible and Scalable Access Control in Cloud Computing”, Information Forensics and 
Security, IEEE Transactions, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 743-754, Oct 2011. 
[108] Z. Shen, L. Li, F. Yan and X. Wu. "Cloud Computing System Based on Trusted 
Computing Platform," in International Conference on Intelligent Computation 
Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2010, pp. 942 - 945.  
[109] Z. Shen and Q. Tong. "The security of cloud computing system enabled by trusted 
computing technology," in 2nd International Conference on Signal Processing Systems 
(ICSPS), 2010, pp. 11-15.  
[110] X. Y. Li, L. T. Zhou, Y. Shi, and Y. Guo. "A trusted computing environment model in 
cloud architecture," in Ninth International Conference on Machine Learning and 
Cybernetics (ICMLC), 2010, pp. 2843-2848.  
140 
 
[111] W. Ma, X. Li, Y. Shi and Y. Guo. “TVMCM: A Trusted VM Clone Model in Cloud 
Computing,” in Information Science and Service Science and Data Mining (ISSDM), 
2012 6th International Conference, 2012, pp. 607-611.  
[112] U. A. Kashif, Z. A. Memon, A. R. Balouch and J. A. Chandio. “Distributed Trust 
Protocol for IaaS Cloud Computing,” in 12th International Bhurban Conference on 
Applied Sciences & Technology (IBCAST), 2015, pp. 257-279.  
[113] W. H. zhang and H. L. sheng. “An improved trusted cloud computing platform model 
based on DAA and Privacy CA scheme,” in 2010 International Conference on Computer 
Application and System Modeling (ICCASM 2010), 2010, pp. V13-33-V13-39.  
[114] N. Singh, S. Matele and S. Singh. “An Efficient Approach for Security of Cloud Using 
Watermarking Technique,” in ICCCT '15 Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Conference on Computer and Communication Technology 2015, 2015, pp. 31-35.  
[115] I. Sudha, N. Vijayalashmy and G. Rupavani. “Implementation of HASH Algorithm in 
Cloud Watermarking Techniques.” IJREAT International Journal of Research in 
Engineering & Advanced Technology, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1-6, May 2014.  
[116] K. Hwang and D. Li. “Trusted Cloud Computing with Secure Resources and Data 
Coloring.” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 14-22, Sept-Oct 2010. 
[117] M. Alhamad, T. Dillon and E. Chang. “SLA-Based Trust Model for Cloud Computing,” 
in Network-Based Information Systems (NBiS), 2010 13th International Conference, 
2010, pp. 321-324.  
[118] A. M. Hammadi and O. Hussain. “A Framework for SLA Assurance in Cloud 
Computing,” in 26th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and 
Applications Workshops, 2012, pp. 394-398.  
141 
 
[119] S. Chakraborty. “An SLA-based Framework for Estimating Trustworthiness of a Cloud,” 
in Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2012 
IEEE 11th International Conference, 2012, pp. 937-942.  
[120] O. Jules, A. Hafid and M. A. Serhani. “Bayesian Network, and Probabilistic Ontology 
Driven Trust Model for SLA Management of Cloud Services,” in Third International 
Conference, ACIIDS, 2014, pp. 77-83.  
[121] L. Qi, W. Dou, J, Ni, X. Xia, C. Ma and J. Liu. “A Trust Evaluation Method for Cloud 
Services with Fluctuant QoS and Flexible SLA,” in 2014 IEEE International Conference 
on Web Services, 2014, pp. 345-352. 
[122] Z. Yang, X. Qin, Y. Yang and T. Yagnik. “A Hybrid Trust Service Architecture for 
Cloud Computing,” in 2013 International Conference on Computer Sciences and 
Applications, 2013, pp. 674-680.  
[123] S. M. Habib, S. Ries and M. Muhlhauser. “Towards a Trust Management System for 
Cloud Computing.” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 1641–
2236, Nov 2014.  
[124] A. Kanwal, R. Masood and M. A. Shibli. “Evaluation and Establishment of Trust in 
Cloud Federation”, in 8th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information 
Management and Communication, 2014, pp. 12-25.  
[125] D. Marudhadevi, V. N. Dhatchayani and V. S. Shankar Sriram. “A Trust Evaluation 
Model for Cloud Computing Using Service Level Agreement.” Oxford Computer 
Journal, vol. 58, no. 10, pp. 2225-2232, Nov 2014. 
[126] P. S. Pawar, M. Rajarajan, S. K. Nair and A. Zisman. “Trust model for optimized cloud 
services.” Trust Management VI, vol. 374, pp. 97–112, 2012. 
142 
 
[127] X. Wu. “A Fuzzy Reputation-based Trust Management Scheme for Cloud Computing.” 
International Journal of Digital Content Technology and its Applications (JDCTA), vol. 
6, no. 17, pp. 437-445, Sept 2012. 
[128] Z. Yang, L. Qiao, C. Liu, C. Yang and G. Wan. “A Collaborative Trust Model of 
Firewall-through based on Cloud Computing,” in Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
in Design (CSCWD), 2010 14th International Conference, 2010, pp. 329-334.  
[129] V. Varadharajan and U. Tupakula. “TREASURE: Trust Enhanced Security for Cloud 
Environments,” in 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and 
Privacy in Computing and Communications, 2012, pp. 145-152. 
[130] W. Li, L. Ping and X. Pan. "Use trust management module to achieve effective security 
mechanisms in cloud environment," in International Conference on Electronics and 
Information Engineering (ICEIE), 2010, pp. 14-19.  
[131] W. Li and L. Ping. “Trust Model to Enhance Security and Interoperability of Cloud 
Environment,” in CloudCom ’09 proceeding of the 1st international conference on cloud 
computing, Springerm, 2009, pp. 69-79. 
[132] X. Li and J. Du. “Adaptive and attribute-based trust model for service level agreement 
guarantee in cloud computing.” Information Security, IET, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 39-50, Mar 
2013 
[133] B. K. Raju and G. Geethakumari. “A Model for Trust Enhancement in Cloud 
Computing,” in Computer and Communications Technologies (ICCCT), 2014 
International Conference, 2014, pp. 1-5.  
143 
 
[134] S. M. Habib, S. Ries and M. Muhlhauser. “Towards a Trust Management System for 
Cloud Computing,” in 2011 International Joint Conference of IEEE TrustCom-11/IEEE 
ICESS-11/FCST-11, 2011, pp. 933-939.  
[135] Z. Song, J. Molina and C. Strong. "Trusted Anonymous Execution: A Model to 
RaiseTrust in Cloud," in 9th International Conference on Grid and Cooperative 
Computing (GCC), Nanjing, China, 2010, 2010, pp. 133 - 138.  
[136] H. Sato, A. Kanai and S. Tanimoto. "A Cloud Trust Model in a Security Aware Cloud," 
in 10th IEEE/IPSJ International Symposium on Applications and the Internet (SAINT), 
2010, pp. 121 - 124.  
[137] R. K. L. Ko, P. Jagadpramana, M. Mowbray, S. Pearson, M. Kirchberg, Q. Liang and B. 
S. Lee. “TrustCloud: A Framework for Accountability and Trust in Cloud Computing,” 
in 2011 IEEE World Congress on Services, 2011, pp. 584-588.  
[138] M. Almorsy, J. Grundy and A. S. Ibrahim. “Collaboration-Based Cloud Computing 
Security Management Framework,” in IEEE 4th International Conference on Cloud 
Computing, 2011, pp. 364-371.  
